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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980-81 term of the Seventh Circuit does not give civil rights
litigants much cause for encouragement. This can be attributed, at
least in part, to the small number of cases presenting significant, con-
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troversial issues of importance in the area of civil rights litigation. It is
also attributable to the general unwillingness of the court to resist some
of the oppressive signals from the Supreme Court. During a period
such as this when the Supreme Court is not particularly friendly toward
civil rights matters, the hope is that the appellate courts will take some
of the sting out of its adverse decisions by a strict, limiting construction.
Unfortunately, it generally appears that the Seventh Circuit is getting
the message all too well.
There were, however, a few bright spots. In the first amendment
area, the court refused to abandon traditional first amendment doctrine
in dealing with the controversial issue of regulating adult entertain-
ment. It also took a strict approach to an employer's obligation under
federal law to accommodate the religious needs of employees. On the
abortion question, the court refused to retreat from the strict scrutiny
analysis formulated in early Supreme Court decisions and it struck sev-
eral provisions of an Illinois law which severely limited a woman's
freedom of choice. With an exception or two, the decisions regarding
attorney's fees under civil rights statutes were generally favorable to-
ward plaintiffs. The procedural due process cases certainly do not re-
flect any retreat from the fairly well-established analysis required by
the Supreme Court.
Obviously, not all of the decisions can be discussed in a survey of
this type. However, an effort was made to at least refer to all cases,
even if only by way of footnotes. The organization represents an at-
tempt to discuss the cases under topics most likely to arise in the con-
text of civil rights litigation. For this reason, several of the cases are
discussed at various places. When relevant, decisions of the Supreme
Court and other federal appellate courts are mentioned to facilitate ad-
ditional research and provide a basis for comparing the Seventh Circuit
with other circuits.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A. Zoning and Licensing of Adult Entertainment
The Seventh Circuit decided two interesting and somewhat con-
flicting first amendment cases involving the particularly troublesome
and controversial problem of regulating adult entertainment. The
United States Supreme Court in the case of Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.I set the stage for the conflict by upholding Detroit's
1. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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"anti-skidrow" ordinance, a zoning provision which restricted the loca-
tion of new theaters showing sexually explicit "adult" movies. The de-
cision was critical due to the justifications articulated in the plurality
opinion of Justice Stevens. Until the Young decision the Supreme
Court had followed a well-established principle that government may
not control speech because of its content.2 A core first amendment pre-
cept dictates that government may not decide what ideas are worthy of
discussion nor may it discriminate among ideas.3 The Detroit provi-
sion in Young was clearly aimed at one particular type of informa-
tion--sexually explicit expression. Nonetheless, the plurality upheld
the ordinance, arguing that the provision was "viewpoint neutral" and
that it did not reflect government approval or disapproval of any par-
ticular message. 4 Even more controversial was Justice Stevens' state-
ment that "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to
preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited
in the theaters of our choice."5 That statement, concurred in by four
Justices, implies that sexually explicit expression has less value than
other forms of protected speech.
2. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (striking an ordinance prohibiting
the showing of nudity in drive-in theaters visible from the street). See also Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
3. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96. See Farber, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 727 n.2 (1980), for a list of Supreme
Court decisions supporting the content neutrality doctrine.
4. 427 U.S. at 70. The same concept of viewpoint neutrality is stressed in Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 838-39 (1976), and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Several commenta-
tors have rejected this distinction. See, e.g., L. TmIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 672
(1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]; Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. Cli. L. REv. 20, 28 (1975); Stone, Restrictions on Speech Because of its Content.- The Peculiar
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CrI. L. REv. 81, 86 (1978). Cf. Schauer, Categories and
the First Amendment.4A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265, 283-96 (1981) (finds justifica-
tions for recognizing different levels of protection based on the category of speech involved). Ob-
viously, the critical problem is that "facially neutral" subject matter restrictions may be used to
disguise government's attempt to control a particular viewpoint.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have challenged the correctness of this concept. See, e.g.,
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2898 (1981) (Justice White in a plurality
opinion reiterated his objection to the concept that restrictions on free speech are permissible "so
long as government does not favor one side over another on a subject of public controversy");
Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) ("The First Amendment's
hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but
also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic."). The division on the court regarding
this issue is clearly reflected in the dissenting opinion in Metromedia See 101 S. Ct. at 2909
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
5. 427 U.S. at 70. It should be stressed that the opinion reflected only a plurality of the
Court. Justice Powell, writing separately, specifically declined to adopt this "less protected" con-
cept. Instead he relied on the four-part test in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), see
note 19 infra, to uphold the provision as a valid zoning provision, utilizing "scatter" or "dispersal"
zoning to prevent the deterioration of surrounding areas. 427 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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The question raised by the Young decision was whether the
Supreme Court was going to start on a track of assessing the social
value of different kinds of expression.6 It was also unclear as to what
impact the decision would have on some of the well-established princi-
ples surrounding the first amendment. For example, how would the
Court deal with the recurring problems of vagueness, overbreadth and
unbridled discretion in the censor posed by the regulation of sexually
explicit materials? Perhaps the most immediate impact of the opinion
was the growth in zoning-type provisions modeled after the Detroit or-
dinance. In Genusa v. City ofPeoria,7 for example, the Seventh Circuit
upheld a zoning provision which was aimed at adult book stores. The
zoning aspect, the court held, was indistinguishable from that in the
Young case as far as the city's valid interest in preventing the congrega-
tion of adult entertainment with its attendant urban blight.8 The Sev-
enth Circuit, however, did strike two other aspects of the ordinance.
The court held that a prelicensing requirement and a ban on convicted
persons procuring a license constituted invalid prior restraints. 9 The
city could not single out adult bookstores for special regulation unless
the regulation was narrowly devised to further a substantial and legiti-
mate state interest unrelated to the suppression of protected expres-
sion. 0 Since the regulations had nothing to do with the "scatter"
zoning purpose of the ordinance and no other justification was given to
sustain their validity, they both were held to be invalid restrictions on
the first amendment." I
This term the Seventh Circuit decided two cases involving the reg-
ulation of adult entertainment.' 2 In the case of Entertainment Concepts,
Inc. III v. Maciejewski,13 the Seventh Circuit reviewed two Village of
Westmont ordinances aimed at controlling adult movie theaters. The
6. See TRiBE, supra note 4, at 674; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REv. 58,
200, 205 (1976).
7. 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980).
8. Other courts have reached the same conclusion, upholding zoning provisions clearly
aimed at the location of adult entertainment. Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980) (upholding a county ordinance restricting the location of sexually
oriented commercial enterprises); Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir.
1979), cer. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980) (upholding a North Carolina provision prohibiting a sec-
ond establishment in a building where one was already located). But see Bayside Enterprises, Inc.
v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (striking 2500-foot restriction on location of adult
entertainment near churches, schools, etc. as amounting to a flat ban).
9. 619 F.2d at 1219.
10. Id
11. Id
12. Chulchian v. City of Indianapolis, 633 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1980); Entertainment Concepts,
Inc. III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
13. 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
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first ordinance zoned adult movie theaters as "special use," thus requir-
ing special prior authorization from the Village Board of Trustees
before the theater could operate. The second ordinance, referred to as
a "license revocation" ordinance, permitted a license to be temporarily
or permanently suspended upon a finding by a citizens' movie review
committee that a film was obscene. The movie review committee, to-
gether with the mayor, had the power to revoke the licenses of those
who violated a prohibition against showing obscene films. Despite the
fact that the city was seeking to regulate adult entertainment via a
"zoning ordinance," the Seventh Circuit recognized the true nature of
the provision and applied traditional first amendment doctrine to strike
both ordinances.
The zoning ordinance was found to be unconstitutionally vague in
that it failed to define the term "adult."' 4 The court, following the
standards enunciated in Grayned v. City of Rockford,' 5 held that the
ordinance (1) failed to give persons of ordinary intelligence a reason-
able opportunity to know what was prohibited; (2) permitted arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement because of its vagueness; and (3) oper-
ated to inhibit the expression of free speech.16 In addition, the Seventh
Circuit held that the ordinance was an impermissible classification of
speech based on content and a prior restraint on protected communica-
tion.' 7 While recognizing that the Supreme Court in the Young deci-
sion had upheld a content-based regulation, the Seventh Circuit
distinguished Young by noting that no valid state interest was asserted
by the Village to justify its restriction. 8 Relying upon the four-part
O'Brien test used by Justice Powell in his concurrence in Young,' 9 the
Seventh Circuit held that this ordinance-unlike that in the Young
case-amounted to the suppression of speech, not mere regulation
"[s]ince its aim. . . sweeps beyond unprotected obscenity. ' 20 The pro-
vision was not devised to further substantial and legitimate state inter-
14. 631 F.2d at 503.
15. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
16. 631 F.2d at 501.
17. Id at 503.
18. Id at 503-04.
19. 427 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring). The four-part test requires that (1) the govern-
ment has authority to act; (2) the regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest; (3) such
interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (4) the restriction on alleged first amend-
ment freedom is no greater than is essential to further that interest. United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968). One federal court has noted that the lack of a clearly articulated standard in
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion has led lower federal courts to follow Justice Powell's analysis.
See Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1226 (N.D. Ga. 1981). See also Hart Book
Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 825 (4th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980).
20. 631 F.2d at 504.
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ests unrelated to censorship; rather, Westmont officials were given
unbridled discretion to grant or deny special use permits. Thus, the
court concluded that the ordinance satisfied none of the requirements
for constitutional regulation of "adult" materials under Young and its
earlier Genusa decision.
As to the license revocation provision, the court correctly found
that it failed to provide sufficient procedural protection of speech.2 1
The court relied on the standards established by the Supreme Court in
Freedman v. Maryland,22 requiring that (1) the burden of instituting
judicial proceedings rest on the censor; (2) any restraint prior to judi-
cial review be imposed only to preserve the status quo; and (3) prompt
final judicial determination be assured. 23 The Westmont provision
failed to meet any of the Freedman requirements. Obscenity could be
determined by a citizens' movie review board together with the mayor,
and there was no provision for judicial participation prior to the insti-
tution of penalties. 24 Finally, the court noted that the ordinance was in
violation of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co. ,25 which invalidated a Texas statute that permitted the
closing of theaters adjudged to be maintaining a nuisance. The Court
in Vance affirmed the appellate court's holding that future conduct
which might fall within the purview of the first amendment could not
be prohibited based on a finding of unprotected present conduct. 26
Although the court's reliance on the O'Brien test was perhaps un-
necessary, the Seventh Circuit did correctly limit the Young decision,
and it applied existing doctrine regarding content neutrality, vagueness
and prior restraint in striking down a repressive provision.
Two weeks after the Maciejewski decision, the same panel decided
Chulchian v. City of Indianapolis,27 a case involving application of a
general business licensing ordinance to an adult movie theater. Charles
Chulchian was denied a license to operate his adult movie theater in
Indianapolis based on his violation of a city ordinance which imposed
a duty on licensees not to permit any sort of illegal, immoral or obscene
21. Id at 505.
22. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
23. Id at 58-59.
24. 631 F.2d at 505. See also Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1980)
(invalidating a Washington "moral nuisance" statute in part for violating Freedman standards);
Wendling v. City of Duluth, 495 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Minn. 1980); Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. of
Texas v. Byrd, 472 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
25. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
26. Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir. 1978), af#'d, 445 U.S. 308
(1980).
27. 633 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1980).
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conduct or practices to take place on their premises. Chulchian had
apparently been subjected to some ten arrests on the premises for ille-
gal, immoral or obscene conduct. The district court held that the terms
"immoral" and "obscene" were unconstitutionally vague.28 However,
the lower court did find that the city could constitutionally deny a i-
cense on the basis of illegal conduct on the premises other than prior
convictions for showing obscene films.2 9
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's conclu-
sion that the "illegal conduct" part of the ordinance was valid.30 The
provision was not unconstitutionally vague because the city had pro-
vided a narrowing construction to the statute.3' In upholding the dis-
trict court's conclusion that the city could prohibit the issuance of a
license to an individual who had permitted illegal conduct on the
premises, the court stated, "Businesses which deal in material protected
by the First Amendment . ..are not immune from all regulation.
They can be subject to the usual panoply of health, safety, licensing,
and zoning regulations as all other businesses."'32 The court again ap-
plied the standard of O'Brien33 and concluded that the government reg-
ulation was justified despite its incidental impact on speech.3 4 The
court found that the regulation was not based on content, but rather
was an ordinance which generally held operators of businesses respon-
sible for the conduct on their premises. 35 Thus the ordinance promoted
28. Evansville Book Mart, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 477 F. Supp. 128, 133 (S.D. Ind.
1979), afd sub nom. Chulchian v. City of Indianapolis, 633 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1980).
29. 477 F. Supp. at 133.
30. 633 F.2d at 31. The Seventh Circuit clarified that the denial of licenses based on prior
obscenity convictions would violate the Supreme Court's decision in Vance. Id at 32.
31. Id at 31.
32. Id On the issue of license denial or revocation based on criminal conduct, compare
Borrago v. City of Louisville, 456 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Ky. 1978) (upholding an ordinance which
permitted revocation of a license where the owner, any employee, partner, director or shareholder
of a place of adult entertainment had committed a felony or crime of moral turpitude), with Corn-
flower Entertainment, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 485 F. Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1980) (license
revocation of an adult theater based on past obscenity convictions constitutes invalid prior re-
straint), and Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 470 F. Supp. 1140 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (license
denial or revocation based on a prior specified criminal act is an invalid prior restraint), and
Natco Theatres, Inc. v. Ratner, 463 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (an ordinance allowing denial
of a license to owners and operators convicted of a number of enumerated crimes violates the first
amendment). In the latter, the district court held that any system of prior restraint based upon
past convictions could be sustained only if "granting a license to an individual with such a record
would present a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil." Id at 1131. The court
justified its conclusion in part by reference to several state supreme court decisions which invali-
dated similar systems of restraint. See id at 1129. Under such a strict standard, the Indianapolis
ordinance in Chulchian would probably fail.
33. See note 19 supra.
34. 633 F.2d at 31.
35. Id at 31-32.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
the city's dual goal of encouraging business responsibility and protect-
ing patrons who frequent the premises.3 6 The court concluded that the
ordinance furthered a legitimate substantial government interest unre-
lated to the suppression of free speech and therefore was valid under an
O'Brien analysis.37
Although at first blush the decisions reached in Chulchian and
Macieewski appear somewhat conflicting, the Seventh Circuit was
probably correct in reaching its conclusions in both. The ordinances
were similar in that they imposed prior restraints on first amendment
rights, thus triggering strict review.38 In Chulchian, the ordinance
granted discretion to the controller and license review board to con-
sider the quantity and quality of "illegal conduct," while in Macieew-
ski, the Village Board of Trustees determined what business es-
tablishments were "adult" and thus in need of special use permits.
The same panel of judges upheld the former ordinance against a vague-
ness attack while striking the latter. The court in Chulchian focused on
the narrowing construction the city had made, t:e., that the city could
not deny a license based on conduct beyond the licensee's control and
that the licensee must have actual knowledge of the illegal conduct
before he would be subject to the ordinance. 39 The court concluded
that since persons are deemed to have knowledge of the law, the ordi-
nance was not vague as to licensees.40 As far as first amendment impli-
cations, the court characterized the ordinance as having merely "an
incidental impact on speech."' 41 This was a general business licensing
provision holding operators responsible for conduct on the premises,
not an attempt to regulate adult theaters based on content. The pur-
pose of the provision was simply to encourage business responsibility
and to protect patrons from illegal conduct. 42
In contrast, the facts in Maciejewski indicate that the special zon-
ing ordinance was amended by city officials to include adult movie the-
aters in order to control the plaintiff, who operated the only theater in
36. Id at 32.
37. Id
38. A line of Supreme Court cases holds that regulations which impose prior restraints upon
free speech guarantees must provide narrow objective standards to guide the licensing authority.
See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
150-51 (1969). But see Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L.
REV. 422, 455 (1980) (discussing the erosion of the doctrine against prior restraints by the Burger
Court).
39. 633 F.2d at 31-32.
40. Id at 31.
41. Id
42. Id at 32.
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the Village of Westmont. The term "adult" in the ordinance was left
totally undefined, leaving persons uncertain as to whether they were
even subject to the special use provision and providing no standard for
those administering the ordinance. 43 More importantly, the Village
could not point to any state interest other than the suppression of
speech. The stated aim of the Village was "to regulate the showing of
sexually explicit movies," 44 not simply to regulate location to prevent
urban blight, as in Young.45 While assessing the purpose or motive of a
provision is often an unsure and difficult task, the court could clearly
ascertain the broad impact of the Village ordinance on first amendment
rights. The impact was much greater than that imposed by the zoning
provision in Young, which merely controlled the location and which
left ample sites for adult theaters to accommodate all patrons as well as
distributors and exhibitors of adult films. The market for sexually ex-
plicit material was said to be "essentially unrestrained." 46
The correctness of the Seventh Circuit decisions on speech regula-
tion is buttressed by two recent Supreme Court opinions.47 In Hefron
v. International Societyfor Krishna Consciousness,48 the Court noted
that the state has a right to impose time, place and manner restrictions
on first amendment rights provided "'that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a signif-
icant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open alter-
native channels for communication of the information.' -49 In Hefron,
the Court upheld a rule requiring organizations desiring to distribute,
sell and solicit donations at a state fair to conduct activities only at
assigned locations within the fairgrounds. The Court focused on the
following points: (1) the rule applied evenhandedly to all who wished
to distribute and sell materials, ie., there was no evidence of any kind
43. 631 F.2d at 501. Although the defendants urged the Seventh Circuit to adopt a narrow
construction and thus save the ordinance, the court said this could not be accomplished "without
wholesale rewriting of the statute." Id at 502. See airo Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 5 11 F.
Supp. 1207, 1221 (N.D. Ga. 1981), relying in part on Maciejewski to strike an adult zoning provi-
sion as unconstitutionally overbroad.
44. 631 F.2d at 504.
45. 427 U.S. at 71.
46. Id at 62. The Court emphasized that the situation would be different if the effect of the
ordinance was to greatly restrict access to lawful speech. Id at 71 n.35. Justice Powell's concur-
rence stressed the same point. Id at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Purple Onion, Inc. v.
Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1223-24 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (striking an ordinance which would reduce
access to sexually oriented entertainment).
47. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981).
48. 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981).
49. Id at 2564 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
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of arbitrary application of the provisions; (2) the state had a strong
interest in controlling crowds at a fair-part of a well-recognized and
accepted state need to protect the safety and convenience of persons
using public forums; (3) it was quite improbable that any alternative
means could accomplish the same state interest in light of the large
number of distributors and solicitors who would be entitled to the same
rights sought by the Krishna group; and (4) the provision left open al-
ternative forums for the expression of the plaintiffs protected speech at
booths on the fairgrounds and anywhere outside the fairgrounds. 50
Thus, while the Court upheld the alleged interference with first
amendment rights, it did so only after subjecting the provision to close
scrutiny. In its other major first amendment decision, Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim,5 the Court made clear that the Young decision
would not support the view that traditional first amendment doctrine
may be abandoned based on the Court's assessment of the societal
worth of a particular class of expression. The Court struck down the
use of the Borough's code to prohibit all live entertainment. While not-
ing the government's power to zone and control land use, the Court
held that zoning provisions which infringe on protected liberty interests
must be narrowly drawn and must further sufficiently substantial gov-
ernment interests.52 The Young decision was distinguished on two ma-
jor points. First, in Young, the restriction on the location of adult
movie theaters imposed a minimal burden on protected speech,
whereas in Schad, the municipality sought to ban all live entertain-
ment. Referring to Young, the Supreme Court noted that the decision
"did not imply that a municipality could ban all adult theaters-much
less all live entertainment or all nude dancing-from its commercial
districts city-wide."' 53 Second, Young was distinguished in that the evi-
dence clearly established that the concentration of adult movie theaters
in limited areas leads to deterioration of surrounding neighborhoods;5 4
thus a significant state interest was established. Mount Ephraim, on the
50. 101 S. Ct. at 2564-67.
51. 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981).
52. Id at 2182-83.
53. Id at 2184. Compare this conclusion with New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452
U.S. 714 (1981), where the Court, in a per curiam decision, upheld a New York Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Law flatly prohibiting topless dancing in establishments licensed by the state to sell
liquor for on-premises consumption. The Court construed the twenty-first amendment as a broad
source of power permitting states to make this "policy decision." Id at 715. Cf also Olitsky v.
O'Malley, 597 F.2d 295 (1st Cir. 1979) (upholding "anti-mingling" regulation of the Boston Li-
censing Board); Brubeck v. Florida, No. 80-229 (Fla. Cir. Ct.), cert. denied, 384 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 3133 (1981) (upholding constitutionality of a
county ban on nudity in bars).
54. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
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other hand, had not adequately justified its substantial restriction on
protected activities. The alleged city interests were in no way associ-
ated merely with live entertainment; the ordinance was not narrowly
drawn to respond to the distinctive problems that might be said to arise
from certain types of live entertainment; nor was there any showing
that restrictions less intrusive on protected forms of expression could
not be drafted."5 Finally, the Court noted that to be reasonable any
restrictions must leave open adequate alternative channels of commu-
nication and "the Borough totally excludes all live entertainment, in-
cluding non-obscene nude dancing that is otherwise protected by the
First Amendment. '56
By applying Heffron's four-prong analysis to the Seventh Circuit
decisions in Chulchian and Maciejewski, the opposing results reached
in the cases appear justified. Chuichian involved a content-neutral pro-
vision aimed at all business establishments seeking to control and to
encourage business responsibility and to protect patrons of business es-
tablishments. Thus, important government interests were asserted
which were unrelated to content and the facts indicated that alternative
forums of communication were left open. Maciejewski, on the other
hand, involved an ordinance which was clearly content-based and
which served no significant government interest other than the control
of the particular content of the expression. It left open no alternative
forums of communication (in that this theater was the only one in the
municipality57) and the provision was described as overbroad and over-
inclusive.58 The court thus displayed the appropriate sensitivity to the
first amendment issues at stake and struck the Village's attempt to rely
on Young to suppress expression.
B. Regulation of Government Employee and Student Expression
In addition to the zoning and licensing cases, the Seventh Circuit
dealt with the first amendment rights of government employees and
students. Both groups have been recognized as enjoying a somewhat
qualified right to free expression. The question of how to balance the
interests of these special groups against the government's interest in ef-
ficiency and harmony faced the court in some difficult fact situations.
First, in the case of Wren v. Jones,59 twenty-six employees of the
55. 101 S. Ct. at 2186.
56. Id
57. 631 F.2d at 498.
58. See id at 501 n.2.
59. 635 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 129 (1981).
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State of Illinois alleged that they were discharged for political reasons
in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Elrod v. Burns.60 The
state argued that the terminations were not based on the employees'
political beliefs at all, but rather were due to fiscal problems that had
been aggravated by an Illinois circuit court decision mandating the re-
instatement of previous employees who had been fired without cause
contrary to Illinois law.61 Recognizing that this was not the typical
political patronage dismissal case, the Seventh Circuit noted that other
courts of appeals had taken opposing approaches to first amendment
issues involving government employees by relying on different
Supreme Court precedents. In Pickering v. Board of Education,62 the
Court held that in determining whether government employees' speech
is constitutionally protected, there must be "a balance between the in-
terests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promot-
ing the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employ-
ees."' 63 Taking a somewhat different approach, the Supreme Court, in
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,64 held
that, before balancing any interests, the plaintiff must initially establish
that his protected conduct was in fact a "motivating factor" in a termi-
nation decision.65 The Court's recent opinion in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District66 reaffirmed that an employee must first
show that his constitutionally protected conduct played a "'substantial'
role in the employer's decision not to rehire him," and, further, that the
employer must be given the opportunity "to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to the
employee's reemployment even in the absence of the protected
conduct. '67
The pure balancing approach espoused in Pickering was recently
60. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Elrod was recently reaffirmed by the Court's decision in Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
61. 635 F.2d at 1285.
62. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
63. Id at 568.
64. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
65. Id at 287.
66. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
67. Id at 416: This standard was heavily criticized by Professor Thomas I. Emerson as plac-
ing too heavy a burden on one deprived of first amendment rights. Emerson, First Amendment
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 470 (1980). For a more recent discussion of
the relative burdens, see Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff has burden of
proving that the protected conduct was a substantial or a motivating factor in the action taken
against him before the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the termination would have oc-
curred even absent the protected activity).
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used by the Second Circuit in an employee dismissal case. 68 The First
Circuit, however, in a case similar to Wren, relied on Mt. Healthy and
Givhan in requiring that defendants be given the opportunity to prove
that terminations were necessitated by financial circumstances and not
due to political affiliation.69
In Wren, the Seventh Circuit began by acknowledging that if
political association was the sole basis for the dismissal, a strict scrutiny
analysis would have to be applied under the Supreme Court decisions
in Branti70 and Elrod.71 Since this was not the case, the court turned to
Mt. Healthy, but it misconstrued the standard by asking whether polit-
ical affiliation was the motivating factor.72 Mt. Healthy requires the
plaintiff to establish only that protected expression was a motivating
factor. Nonetheless, the court held that, even assuming the plaintiffs
had satisfied the first part of the Mt. Healthy test, the defendants had
established by a preponderance of the evidence that fiscal restraints re-
quired a reduction in the work force and justified the dismissals. 73 The
court did go on to apply, in the alternative, a Pickering balancing test
and concluded that the state's interest in fiscal integrity outweighed the
minimal intrusion on the plaintiffs' first amendment rights.74 The
court's apparent preference for Mt. Healthy over Pickering was justified
in this case, because the defendant's primary allegation was that it was
not motivated by a desire to suppress first amendment rights. Although
generally the question of motivation should not be a stumbling block
for plaintiffs who have truly been injured because of the exercise of first
amendment rights, Wren presented an especially appropriate case for
the application of Mt. Healthy. The Wren plaintiffs were Republicans
chosen from a larger group consisting solely of Republicans, and there
was no evidence that the plaintiffs had engaged in any political speech
or association (other than being registered Republicans) which had
68. Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 1979). The dis-
trict court, relying on Mi. Healthy, determined that various communications plaintiff had engaged
in were simply part of a "pattern of conduct" which fell outside first amendment protection. The
Second Circuit rejected the district court's reliance on M. Healthy, finding that plaintiff's conduct
was generally protected by the first amendment, and thus his allegations required a Pickering
balancing approach. Id at 28.
69. Rosaly v. Ignacio, 593 F.2d 145, 148-49 (1st Cir. 1979). See also Seizer v. Fleisher, 629
F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981) (applying Aft. Healthy in a public em-
ployee dismissal case).
70. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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given rise to the terminations. 75 The question of whether first amend-
ment rights were implicated at all was clearly before the court and jus-
tified its application of Mt. Healthy.
The contrast between the Pickering approach and the Mt. Healthy
approach to first amendment issues is further illustrated by the Seventh
Circuit decision in Yoggerst v. Stewart.76 In Yoggerst, the question of
illegal motivation was not at issue. The defendants clearly acted to
punish the plaintiff for the words she uttered, and the only question
was whether they could justify their conduct. The plaintiff, an em-
ployee of the Illinois Governor's Office of Manpower and Human De-
velopment, was reprimanded by her supervisors for having made a
comment to a fellow worker derogatory of the director of the organiza-
tion. She had simply called and asked a fellow employee whether he
had heard any "good news," referring to an unconfirmed report that
the director of the group had been fired. In response to this single tele-
phone conversation, the plaintiff was orally warned that her conduct
was unprofessional and a written memorandum was placed in her per-
sonnel file. The district court granted summary judgment based on its
finding that the defendants had not infringed on any of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights.77
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment, finding that the verbal reprimand followed by the
written memorandum placed in the personnel file may have constituted
a violation of the plaintiff's first amendment rights. 78 Following an ear-
lier Seventh Circuit decision, the court stated that the test of unconsti-
tutional retaliation was "whether the adverse action taken by the
defendants is likely to chill the exercise of constitutionally protected
speech."'79 The court proceeded to apply the Pickering balancing test 0
to determine whether a public employee's speech is protected under the
first amendment. The Seventh Circuit articulated the factors that
would be important in a Pickering analysis, i e., whether the individual
speech would somehow interfere with the maintenance of discipline or
harmony among coworkers and whether the employment relationship
required personal loyalty and confidence to function properly.81 It
75. Id
76. 623 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1980).
77. Id at 36.
78. Id at 39.
79. Id (quoting McGill v. Board of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 1979)).
80. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
81. 623 F.2d at 40. There has been some recent controversy over the so-called "Pickering
defenses." The Fifth Circuit recently rejected a defendant's attempt to justify its action based on
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found no evidence that the plaintiffs casual comment could have in
any way disrupted the harmony or discipline of the office; such a com-
ment simply did not rise "to the level of threat to the departmental
order or harmony. '8 2
In another interesting case in which the court relied heavily on its
analogy to the government employee situation, the Seventh Circuit up-
held the right of the Army Reserve Officer's Training Corps8 3 to ex-
clude the plaintiff based on his political and social beliefs. In
Blameuser v. Andrews,84 the ROTC conceded that it had denied the
plaintiff's application based on his Nazi sympathies and his views on
white supremacy. The Seventh Circuit has clearly upheld the right of
Nazis to exercise first amendment freedoms, 85 but the court distin-
guished this case in that it involved the government withholding a ben-
efit rather than attempting to suppress the plaintiffs ideas or punishing
him for expressing them.86 Although the right-benefit distinction is a
dangerous one to make, the court went on to explain its position by
analogizing this situation to the employment relationship: "[Wihen the
benefit at issue is in the form of the establishment or continuation of an
employment relationship, substantial Government interests may justify
burdens on political speech and association which otherwise could not
withstand the exacting scrutiny given to governmental conduct affect-
ing fundamental rights."8s7 Even in cases such as Elrod, which de-
nounced political patronage systems as unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court left open the question of whether a hiring authority could
demonstrate in a particular situation that party affiliation was an ap-
propriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office
involved.88 Since an enrollee in the ROTC program aspires to commis-
sion as an officer in the armed services and is rewarded by a monthly
stipend, the court determined that "certain burdens on First Amend-
the necessity of maintaining discipline in its police department. Williams v. Board of Regents of
the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3063 (1981). Justice
Rehnquist dissented from the denial of certiorari, believing the court of appeals to have struck the
wrong balance. Id at 3063 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d
560 (3d Cir. 1976), ceri. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977), holding that public criticism of the district
attorney by his first assistant precluded any future working relationship between the parties and
hence was unprotected.
82. 623 F.2d at 41.
83. Hereinafter referred to as ROTC.
84. 630 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1980).
85. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
86. 630 F.2d at 542.
87. Id See also Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting
the state's special interest in regulating the speech of its employees).
88. 630 F.2d at 542 n.4.
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ment interests may be tolerated which otherwise would be im-
permissible. '8 9
In addition to involving the employment situation, this case also
involved the military, where past decisions have noted the special need
for duty and discipline.90 The court held that "[t]he interest of our gov-
ernment in recruiting qualified candidates to be officers in the armed
services is a compelling one which may justify some inquiry into and
consideration of an applicant's political beliefs ... ."91 It determined
that the defendant was justified in finding that this particular plaintiffs
beliefs disqualified him from enrollment in the ROTC advanced
course. Without articulating a precise standard of review, the court
concluded that the defendant's decision was justified in light of the
plaintiff's statements about his unwillingness to serve in the event of
military conffict in the Middle East or Africa. In addition, his views on
race relations drew into question his ability to obey commands, espe-
cially if such commands came from a military superior whom he re-
garded as socially inferior. 92 Blameuser's answers to various questions
negated the possibility of his effective leadership in the military and
therefore justified the infringement on his first amendment rights. The
court concluded that his beliefs were "demonstrably incompatible with
the important public office he seeks and inimical to the vital mission of
the agency he would serve."'93
Although the court followed traditional first amendment doctrine
in requiring the government to come up with a compelling interest to
condone inquiry into the plaintiff's beliefs, it would have been helpful
for the Seventh Circuit to articulate what standard of review would be
sufficient to justify denial of a position based on those beliefs. The
court apparently concluded that disqualification of the plaintiff would
further the government's compelling interest in insuring the recruit-
ment of qualified officers, but there was no discussion as to whether
such denial was necessary to insure the government's interest. Nor was
there any discussion of less restrictive means. Rather, the Seventh Cir-
cuit simply stated, "Whatever the appropriate standard of review, we
hold that the defendants' decision was fully justified." 94
89. Id at 542.
90. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-55 (1980); Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 367-68 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976); Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
91. 630 F.2d at 543.
92. Id
93. Id at 544.
94. Id at 543.
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In addition to recognizing the government's special interests in the
area of employment and military security, the Seventh Circuit also
gave deference to the interests of school boards vis-A-vis students. In
Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp. ,95 the student plaintiffs al-
leged violation of their first amendment rights due to (1) the removal of
various books from certain courses and from the school library based
simply on the personal social, political and moral tastes of the defend-
ant school board, (2) the elimination of seven courses from the high
school curriculum, and (3) the decision not to rehire certain teachers.
The students argued that these actions violated their academic freedom
and their "right to know." 96
A few courts of appeals and district courts have found that stu-
dents' first amendment rights are violated by the "erratic, . . free-
wheeling manner in which the school board removes books."'97 The
Seventh Circuit, in Zykan, however, adopted the lower court's finding
that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a violation of constitutional
rights.98 Although it did vacate the lower court decision with leave to
amend based on the novelty and importance of the issues,99 the thrust
of the Seventh Circuit decision was that students' first amendment
rights are bounded by the level of their intelligence and development,
and that their need for educational guidance predominates over their
asserted rights. l°0 The court held that it was entirely permissible for
school officials to make decisions based on their own social or moral
views and that their discretion must be broad.' 0 ' Since such discretion
was not used to impose a "pall of orthodoxy" on the offerings in the
classroom, nothing in the Constitution permitted judicial interven-
tion.' 02 The court concluded that the facts did not allege "flagrant
abuse of discretion," and that school authorities could not be accused
of substituting rigid exclusive indoctrination in their decisionmaking
95. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
96. Id at 1303.
97. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 416 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Minarcini v. Strongs-
ville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp.
1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
98. 631 F.2d at 1304.
99. Id at 1308-09.
100. Id at 1305.
101. Id The court listed numerous federal court decisions similarly acknowledging the need
for broad discretionary powers in local school boards. Id See also Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d
1200 (4th Cir. 1980), in which the Fourth Circuit stated that "the constitutional right to free speech
of public secondary school students may be modified or curtailed by school regulations 'reason-
ably designed to adjust these rights to the needs of the school environment.'" Id at 1205 (quoting
Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1971)).
102. 631 F.2d at 1306.
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processes. '0 3 In short, the allegations were simply too ephemeral to rise
to a constitutional level.
Judge Swygert saw the facts differently. While he concurred in the
majority's decision to remand,'1 4 he felt that the nature of the books
excised (all dealing with feminism) indicated that the board was cen-
soring a certain subject matter and therefore could be held liable for its
actions. 105 Although the Seventh Circuit did remand the decision, the
burden of proof it imposed on the students is practically impossible to
satisfy. The court in Zykan expressed reluctance, as it did in the later
case of Doe v. Renfrow, °6 to interfere with the exercise of discretion on
the part of local educational authorities. It did, however, guide the
plaintiffs as to the type of allegations they should make in amending
their complaint. The fatal defect was apparently the absence of "any
hint that the decisions of these administrators flow from some rigid and
uniform view of the sort the Constitution makes unacceptable as a basis
for educational decision-making or from some systematic effort to ex-
103. Id
104. Id at 1309 (Swygert, J., concurring in part).
105. Id
106. 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3015 (1981). Doe Y. Renfrow involved
a civil rights action brought by a junior high school student against school and police officials
arising out of an investigation on school premises conducted with drug-detecting dogs. The plain-
tiff was required to empty her pockets after a dog alerted to her during a general classroom inspec-
tion; when the dog still alerted, she was subjected to a nude search. The district court, 475 F.
Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), relying heavily on the school officials' hn locoparentis relationship
with the students, held that (1) the mass detention of students in their classrooms during the
course of the investigation did not deny the students of their fourth amendment rights; (2) the use
of dogs in the classroom to sniff for drugs was not, standing alone, a search under the fourth
amendment; (3) the pocket search, although a search, was not so unreasonable as to violate the
plaintiff's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (4) the
nude search did violate the plaintiffs fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Notwithstanding its finding that the nude search was unreasonable, the court found the
school officials immune from liability because they acted "in good faith and not in ignorance or
disregard of settled indisputable principles of law." Id. at 1027 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975)).
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment except with respect to the school officials' immu-
nity from liability for the nude search. 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980). The court found the officials
to have acted outside the bounds of reason, stating, "It does not require a constitutional scholar to
conclude that a nude search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of
some magnitude. More than that: it is a violation of any known principle of human decency."
Id. at 92-93. The judges on the original panel subsequently denied the plaintiff's petition for
rehearing and a majority of active members of the court denied a rehearing en banc. 635 F.2d 582
(7th Cir. 1980). Four judges--Chief Judge Fairchild and Judges Swygert, Wood and Cudahy-
dissented from the order denying the rehearings, sharing concern particularly over the Seventh
Circuit's acquiescence in the district court's finding that the inspection of students by drug-de-
tecting dogs did not constitute a search. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's petition for a
writ of certiorari. 101 S. Ct. 3015 (1981). Justice Brennan dissented from the denial of certiorari,
id. at 3016, noting that "[tihis Court has long expressed its abhorrence of unfocused, generalized,
information-seeking searches." Id. at 3018.
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clude a particular type of thought."107 The court also left open the pos-
sibility of a valid cause of action if plaintiffs could show that they had
been forbidden to have or read certain materials or if materials had
been made "wholly unavailable to them from other sources. ' 108 Aside
from these extremes, however, the court refused to recognize that first
amendment rights had been violated.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT: THE RELIGION CLAUSES
Two very significant decisions in the area of religion were handed
down by the Seventh Circuit this past term. One involved the federal
statutory prohibition on religious discrimination in employment and
the other focused on the question of government aid to parochial
education.
A. The Statutory Prohibition.- Its Meaning and Its Constitutionality
In Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers,10 9 the Seventh Circuit tackled
the difficult question of interpreting the section of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act which bars discrimination based on religion. 110 A 1972
amendment to the Act added section 7010) defining religion to include
"all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably ac-
commodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious obser-
vance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business.""'I This definition has given rise to a tremendous
amount of controversy among the appellate courts. The controversy
has centered primarily on two issues. First, how much accommodation
is reasonable and what constitutes undue hardship? Second, at what
point does government-required accommodation violate the establish-
ment clause of the Constitution? The Supreme Court thus far has
neither determined the constitutionality of section 701(j) nor clearly de-
fined the meaning of the provision.
The seminal decision in the area is Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison.l t2 There the Court avoided the constitutional issue by
broadly interpreting the section 7010) defense of "undue hardship" to
107. 631 F.2d at 1306.
108. Id
109. 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 587 (1981).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976) provides that it shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's... religion."
111. 42 U.S.C. § 20 00e(j) (1976).
112. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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exist whenever the cost imposed on the employer was more than de
minimis. 113 In Hardison, the plaintiff's religious beliefs barred him
from working the Saturday shift. The Supreme Court held that TWA
had made reasonable accommodation by discussing the issues with
Hardison, attempting to work out a solution and making special ar-
rangements for religious holidays, and that to require further measures
would cause TWA undue hardship.1 4 TWA could not force other em-
ployees to take Hardison's shift because that would have been inconsis-
tent with a valid collective bargaining agreement 15 or would have
involved cost to TWA in the form of lost efficiency in other jobs or
higher wages. 116 This narrow interpretation of section 70 10) has been
characterized as having rendered the reasonable accommodation re-
quirement "all but defunct." ' 17 The courts of appeals decisions after
Hardison appear to indicate that very little must be done by an em-
ployer to establish a de minimis burden.1 8 In fact, the burden of proof
appears to shift to the plaintiff to show that the employer did not make
even the most minimal showing of accommodation.
In Nottelson, the Seventh Circuit made clear that it would join
those federal courts that have given section 7010) a more liberal con-
struction. 119 Nottelson involved a Seventh-Day Adventist whose reli-
113. Id at 84. The dissent deemed the $150 expense that would have been incurred over three
months for overtime pay to be de minimis. Id at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority
rejected that finding, articulating concern over the number of employees who, like Hardison,
might seek similar accommodation at similar expense. Id at 84 n. 15.
114. Id at 77.
115. Id at 79.
116. Id at 84. The Fifth Circuit relied on this aspect of Hardison to find undue hardship
where a plaintiffs absence from work for religious purposes required his replacement with two
supervisors, causing inefficiency in the warehouse operation as well as distraction from the super-
visors' performance of their normal duties. The court noted that the lack of direct monetary cost
to the employer was not controlling. Howard v. Haverty Furniture, 615 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir.
1980).
117. Retter, The Rie and Fall of Title VIIsr Requirement of Reasonable Accommodation for
Religious Employees, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 63, 86 (1979). Retter read post-Iardion
decisions as permitting employers to refuse to accommodate either by citing the hypothetical cost
that would result if similar accommodation was provided others or by referring to the mild objec-
tions of coworkers. Id at 83.
118. See, e.g., Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1979) (employer would bear
more than de minimis cost accommodating plaintiff's desire not to work on his Sabbath); Jordan
v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs demand for a written guaran-
tee that she not be required to work on Saturday was unreasonable and constituted undue hard-
ship to employer). See also Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1039 (1978); Rohr v. Western Elec. Co., 567 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1977).
119. 643 F.2d at 451. See, e.g., Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979)
(reversing district court conclusion that permitting a Sabbatarian to leave the workforce before
sunset on Friday was more than de minimis where the company could not prove it incurred extra
costs and projected future effects were purely theoretical in light of the company's actual experi-
ence); Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1181-82 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that undue hard-
ship must mean present undue hardship as distinguished from anticipated or "multiplied"
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gion taught that it was morally wrong to be a member of or pay dues to
a labor organization. Nottelson requested his union to accommodate
his religious objection by permitting him to pay a sum equivalent to the
dues to a nonreligious, nonunion charity. The union refused and in-
stead put pressure on Smith, Nottelson's employer, to fire him. The
union's key defense was that the enforcement of its union security
clause, which required membership in the union as a condition of con-
tinued employment with Smith, was protected under the National La-
bor Relations Act' 20 and therefore did not violate Title VII.' 21 It also
argued that section 701(j), as sought to be applied, violated the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment. The Seventh Circuit joined
three other courts of appeals 22 in holding that the union's security
clause and its sanction under the NLRA did not override the Title VII
prohibition of religious discrimination. 23 Lack of an express exemp-
tion in Title VII, coupled with the absence of any evidence that Con-
gress intended the courts to imply such an exemption from the NLRA,
convinced the Seventh Circuit that a union security provision does not
relieve an employer or a union of the duty of attempting to make rea-
sonable accommodation to the individual religious needs of its
employees. 124
hardship; otherwise any slight hardship "magnified through prediction of future behavior of the
employee's co-workers" would immunize employers from liability).
120. Hereinafter referred to as the NLRA.
121. Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3) and 158(b)(2) (1976),
recognize the validity of union security clauses and the concomitant right of a union to demand
discharge of an employee for failure to pay dues. Note, however, that a subsequent amendment to
the NLRA requires employers to recognize conscientious objections to joining unions and to per-
mit the charity substitute sought here. See Act of December 24, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-593, 94 Stat.
3452, which replaced § 19 of the NLRA. The new § 19 provides in pertinent part:
Any employee who is a member of and adheres to established and traditional tenets or
teachings of a bona fide religion, body, or sect which has historically held conscientious
objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations shall not be required
to join or financially support any labor organization as a condition of employment; ex-
cept that such employee may be required in a contract between such employees' em-
ployer and a labor organization in lieu of periodic dues and initiation fees, to pay sums
equal to such dues and initiation fees to a nonreligious, nonlabor organization charitable
fund exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of title 26 of the Internal Revenue
Code, chosen by such employee from a list of at least three such funds, designated in
such contract or if the contract fails to designate such funds, then to any such fund
chosen by the employee.
122. Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 928 (1980); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 1978); Cooper v.
General Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163, 170 (5th Cir. 1976), ceri. denied, 433
U.S. 908 (1977). Note that a few recent decisions have gone further and specifically held, as the
Seventh Circuit does here, 643 F.2d at 452, that the substituted charity accommodation would not
cause the union undue hardship. See Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.
1981); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
123. 643 F.2d at 451.
124. Id
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The Seventh Circuit went on to find that the charity substitute ac-
commodation Hardison sought would impose only a de minimis cost
on the union and would not increase the amount or severity of duties
required of coworkers. In upholding this conclusion, the Seventh Cir-
cuit pointed to the following facts: (1) the secretary-treasurer of the
union testified that the union would not be financially injured by the
loss of the plaintiffs dues, which represented only .02% of the union's
annual budget; (2) there was no evidence that the loss of receipts from
the plaintiff would necessitate an increase in the dues of his coworkers,
and that if such an increase were necessary it would amount only to
2.4 cents per year per employee;125 and (3) there was no evidence
presented that other workers would seek similar accommodations or
that the accommodation would lead to a labor strike. Indeed, the char-
ity substitute had already been officially adopted by the Executive
Council of the AFL-CIO as an appropriate accommodation of individ-
ual religious needs. 126 The court concluded that the district court's
findings were thus amply supported by the record.
An even more important part of the decision concerned the ques-
tion of burden of proof. The Seventh Circuit made clear that the bur-
den of making a reasonable accommodation or proving undue
hardship lies with the defendant, in this case the union, and that at trial
the union failed to present any evidence to satisfy its burden. 27 The
court also deemed the employer's reliance upon the collective bargain-
ing agreement to be insufficient. 28 Although arguably Smith could
have faced costs from undergoing a grievance proceeding for not abid-
ing by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the court rea-
soned that Smith could have lessened its exposure and protected the
plaintiff by complying with Title VII and not acceding to the union's
demands. 29
Finally, on the issue of the constitutionality of section 701(j), the
court held that the provision did not violate the first amendment's com-
mand that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. 130 The court relied in part on the decision of Rankins v. Com-
125. The court noted that in Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979), it was held that even an increase of 24 cents per year was
de minimis. 643 F.2d at 452.
126. 643 F.2d at 452.
127. Id The Ninth Circuit similarly placed the burden on the union to show reasonable ac-
commodation. Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981).
128. 643 F.2d at 452.
129. Id at 453.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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mission on Professional Competence'31 in which the California Supreme
Court adopted the language of section 701(j) to interpret its state con-
stitutional provision outlawing religious discrimination in employment
and upheld the constitutionality of such a provision. 32 The Seventh
Circuit proceeded to evaluate and uphold section 701(j) under the
three-part test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man 133 for determining whether a statute is permissible under the es-
tablishment clause. The Nottelson court concluded that the purpose of
Title VII's antidiscrimination provision was to achieve equality of em-
ployment opportunity; that the primary effect was not the advancement
of religion, but only the promotion of "the principle of supremacy of
conscience"; and that section 701(j) did not foster an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion. 34 The court likened the provision to
the conscientious objector exemptions under the selective service stat-
utes which were sanctioned by the Supreme Court. 35 Thus, the Sev-
enth Circuit joined the majority of federal courts which have upheld
the constitutionality of the provision.1 36
Of key significance is the Seventh Circuit decision to impose on
the employer the burden of showing some concrete evidence that more
than a de minimis cost would result if an employee's religious beliefs
were accommodated. A few appellate court decisions have in essence
permitted an employer to refuse accommodation either by citing hypo-
thetical costs that would result if similar accommodation were provided
131. 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 986 (1979).
132. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal
question, 444 U.S. 986 (1979), which arguably is a decision on the merits. See Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1975).
133. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test provides: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion,...; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.' " Id at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citation omitted).
134. 643 F.2d at 454.
135. Id
136. See Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981); Hardison v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Cummins v. Parker
Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aft'd by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Burns
v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,184, at 11,977-78 (D. Ariz. 1979), on re-
mandfrom 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172
(W.D.N.C. 1975). Contra, Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp.
782 (S.D. Cal. 1980); Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1977),
af'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980). See also
Eades, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964-An Unconstitutional Attempt to Establish Religion,
5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59 (1980); Note, The Constitutionality ofan Employer's Duty to Accommo-
date Religious Beliefs and Practices, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 635 (1980) (finding that § 701(j) fails
the secular effects test); Retter, The Rise and Fall ofTitle VIIs Requirement ofReasonable Accom-
modationfor Religious Employees, II COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 63, 84 n.127 (1979) (discussing
several cases on the constitutional issue).
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other workers or by referring to mild objections of the complainant's
coworkers. 137 The Seventh Circuit has chosen to leave the burden of
proof where it was prior to Hardison, i e., on the employer who is obvi-
ously in a better position to provide information as to the economic
costs of accommodation and to require evidence that is more than
merely conjectural.1 38  This position is buttressed by the recent EEOC
guidelines 139 on religious discrimination which require an employer to
demonstrate that undue hardship would in fact result from each avail-
able method of accommodation and which reject mere assumptions
that others will be seeking accommodation as insufficient evidence of
undue hardship. Thus, at least for now, section 7010) has retained its
intended vigor in the Seventh Circuit.
B. Government Aid to Parochial Education
The second important decision regarding religion handed down by
the Seventh Circuit involved the controversial question of government
aid to parochial education. 140 In the case of Decker v. O'Donnell,'4'
suit was brought by three federal taxpayers from Wisconsin seeking a
nationwide injunction prohibiting the payment of certain federal funds
for public service employment positions under Title II, Part D of the
recently amended Comprehensive Employment Training Act of
1973.142 The plaintiffs argued that payment of such funds to elemen-
tary and secondary schools operated by religious or sectarian organiza-
tions violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. 43 As
originally drafted, the only restriction on the placement of CETA em-
ployees in sectarian schools read as follows: "Participants shall not be
employed on the construction, operation, or maintenance of so much of
137. See cases cited note 118 supra.
138. The Ninth Circuit in Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981),
recently adopted the Seventh Circuit's position, holding that "[a] claim of undue hardship cannot
be supported by merely conceivable or hypothetical hardships; instead, it must be supported by
proof of 'actual imposition on co-workers or disruption of the work routine.'" Id at 1243 (quot-
ing Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1978),
ceri. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979)). See also cases cited note 119 supra. This was the position
reflected in pre-Hardison decisions. See, e.g., Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527
F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1976).
139. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1981).
140. The Supreme Court continues to tackle this issue almost every term. See, e.g., Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971).
141. 661 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1980).
142. 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-999 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Hereinafter referred to as CETA.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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any facility as is used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a
place for religious worship."' 44 Subsequent regulations 45 drafted by
the Department of Labor, which took effect on September 17, 1979,
were also challenged by the plaintiffs as not correcting the constitu-
tional infirmity of the CETA provisions. Under the Act, CETA funds
were allocated by the Department of Labor among various prime spon-
sors who in turn would either hire CETA participants themselves or
subgrant the moneys to other governmental entities or eligible non-
profit organizations which then provided employment to CETA par-
ticipants. The fact-finding centered primarily on Milwaukee County as
a prime sponsor and the Archdiocese of Milwaukee as a subgrantee.
The latter received some $329,000 in federal money in the fiscal year
1978 and approximately $143,000 in the fiscal year 1979.146
The Seventh Circuit applied the three-prong test used by the
Supreme Court in determining the validity of state aid to religion: the
legislative enactment must have a secular purpose; its primary effect
must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and it must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion. 47 As to the third
prong of the test, excessive entanglement consists of both "the excessive
administrative surveillance of religious institutions by government
sometimes needed to ensure public funds are not used for religious pur-
poses, . . . and the potential for political division along religious lines
with respect to governmental aid programs." 148 Of key relevance to the
effect and administrative entanglement analysis in this case were the
following facts: (1) the institutions involved were all pervasively sec-
tarian elementary and secondary schools; (2) the CETA workers were
subject to daily supervision of the schools and thus could be considered
employees of the sectarian schools and not government employees; and
(3) the CETA program did not require that public schools receive
levels of CETA worker assistance comparable to those enjoyed by the
sectarian schools.' 49
The Seventh Circuit proceeded to discuss and invalidate the vari-
ous positions permitted by the Department of Labor's regulation. Out-
stationing CETA workers in sectarian schools for the purpose of
providing remedial education services violated the entanglement prong
144. 29 U.S.C. § 823(a)(2) (Supp. Ill 1979) (formerly 29 U.S.C. § 848(h)).
145. 20 C.F.R. § 676.71 (1981).
146. 661 F.2d at 603.
147. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980).
148. 661 F.2d at 606 (citations omitted).
149. Id at 607-09.
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and therefore was unconstitutional. 50 Although the regulations placed
various restrictions upon remedial education teachers, the court none-
theless held that enforcement would be too entangling to pass consti-
tutional muster.151 Placement of CETA workers in instructional
positions in summer or recreation programs or in adult education pro-
grams was held to be invalid. 152 As to the latter, the court reasoned
that even though the Supreme Court has stressed the relative suscepti-
bility of young students to indoctrination, this factor was not decisive in
its decisions to invalidate government aid.153 Since it was not insured
that adult education courses here would match the nondoctrinaire in-
tellectual atmosphere of colleges, where aid has been approved, and
since the instructors were substantially under the control of sectarian
schools, the court felt the adult education program was invalid. 154
The same conclusion was reached with regard to CETA workers
doing custodial child care after school hours where a pervasively sec-
tarian school setting would exist' 5" and with regard to CETA workers
in diagnostic or therapeutic speech and hearing services. 156 Although
the Supreme Court has upheld the permissibility of having diagnosti-
cians who are public employees visit parochial schools, 157 the court dis-
tinguished the situation of "circuit-riding" diagnosticians working for
the state with diagnosticians who in fact were employees of the sectar-
ian school and funded under CETA.' 58 The court proceeded to invali-
date other CETA positions, including, for example, providing services
related to the health and safety of the students, performing functions
with regard to the administration and grading of state-prepared exami-
nations and providing support services for the administration of feder-
ally funded or regulated programs. 159
150. Id at 610.
151. Id But see National Coalition for Pub. Educ. v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), upholding, against a claim of excessive entanglement, the use of funds appropriated under
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-3386 (Supp. I1 1979),
for remedial education of parochial students by public school teachers on the premises of paro-
chial schools. The court determined that the evidence with regard to the character of the schools
as well as the operation of the program established that the Title I program did not create exces-.
sive administrative entanglement nor result in divisive political fragmentation. 489 F. Supp. at
1265-70.
152. 661 F.2d at 610-11.
153. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-88 (1971).
154. 661 F.2d at 611.
155. Id at 612.
156. Id
157. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
158. 661 F.2d at 612.
159. As to test administration, the Supreme Court in Regan held that state reimbursement of
nonpublic schools' cost of administering and grading certain state-mandated and prepared tests
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Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Decker decision was
the court's conclusion that even though the placement of CETA work-
ers in various positions related to the health and food services to stu-
dents would pass muster under both the effect and the administrative
entanglement tests, they still had to be struck as violating the political
divisiveness concept. 160 The general conclusion was that "all place-
ment of CETA workers in sectarian schools is prohibited under the
Constitution because the structure of decisionmaking about funding
creates an impermissible risk of political entanglement for the CETA
program as a whole."' 61 Although the concept of political entangle-
ment was enunciated by the Supreme Court as an important factor in
determining a violation of the establishment clause,' 62 it has never in-
validated a program solely on political entanglement grounds. In fact,
the Supreme Court, in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,163
warned in dicta that "the prospect of [seriously divisive political conse-
quences] may not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws that
otherwise survive the careful scrutiny required by the decisions of this
Court . . . ."16 The Seventh Circuit nonetheless justified its conclu-
sion by pointing to language in various decisions in which the Supreme
Court noted that political entanglement was one of the principal evils
against which the first amendment was intended to protect and that it
constituted a "warning signal" of "an inevitable progression leading to
the establishment of state churches and state religion."' 65
The potential for political divisiveness created by CETA's statu-
tory funding mechanism does appear to be especially strong. The Sev-
was constitutional. 444 U.S. at 652. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Regan on two points: in
Regan the tests were all state-imposed requirements and the grading function gave the schools no
control over the results due to the nature of the exams. In Decker, no such assurances could be
made. 661 F.2d at 613.
160. Id at 615-16.
161. Id at 615.
162. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
163. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
164. Id at 797-98.
165. 661 F.2d at 616 n.34. See also TRIBE, upra note 4, at 868. Tribe stresses the significance
of political divisiveness as a warning signal: "ITihe very symbolism of conspicuous governmental
aid to identifiably religious enterprise is regarded as an independent evil." Id Other recent ap-
pellate courts have similarly focused on this as a critical element. See, e.g., Gilfillan v. City of
Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 931-32 (3d Cir. 1980) (political divisive potential exists in the city's
expenditure of over $200,000 to construct a special platform for the Pope's visit); Hall v. Brad-
shaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1021-22 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981) (including a motor-
ists' prayer on a state map by the North Carolina Department of Transportation has the potential
for entangling the state in a politically divisive conflict). Note that in both cases political divisive-
ness was not the sole basis for invalidating the challenged practices. The Seventh Circuit appears
to be the first court to take that approach.
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enth Circuit pointed to the following factors: 166 (1) the Department of
Labor determines the amount of funds available to any particular
prime sponsor and thus limits the number of CETA workers a prime
sponsor may fund; (2) there is much competition for services of CETA
workers among potential subgrantees, and no limit exists as to the
number of workers any subgrantee may receive; (3) the situation is ag-
gravated by the annual nature of the funding received by subgrantees
which provides successive opportunities for political fragmentation and
division along religious lines; 167 and (4) decisions are made only after
a profusion of comment from the local community, and the prime
sponsor who has final responsibility for local funding decisions has a
wide degree of discretion in choosing among eligible subgrantee
applicants.
The obvious difficulty with the Seventh Circuit's reliance on the
political entanglement prong is that this concept can easily be used to
strike down all types of aid to religion. In the past, however, the
Supreme Court has upheld various forms of aid to parochial schools
under the "child welfare theory." This theory, in Everson v. Board of
Education, 168 for example, supported bus service for children attending
parochial schools; yet such a decision made on an annual basis as to
which children will be transported to which parochial schools and at
what cost to the school district could clearly be another area where
political divisiveness is more than a hypothetical problem. In dis-
missing an appeal in Springfeld School District v. Department of Educa-
tion,169 the Supreme Court recently ruled that the use of public funds
to bus students to religious schools up to ten miles beyond the borders
of their residential school district does not present a substantial federal
question. 170 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court below had relied on the
fact that the primary beneficiaries of the program were students and
that the busing created only "mechanical" contacts between church and
state without any need for excessive surveillance.' 7' A recent district
court decision specifically rejected political divisiveness as a basis for
invalidating nonpublic school busing. ' 72 The court focused on the rela-
tively insignificant amount of state assistance at issue, the lack of ad-
ministrative contacts between the board of education and the church
166. 661 F.2d at 616-17.
167. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975).
168. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
169. 483 Pa. 539, 397 A.2d 1154, appeal dismissed, 443 U.S. 901 (1979).
170. 443 U.S. 901 (1979).
171. 483 Pa. at 565-66, 397 A.2d at 1167-68 (citing TRiBE, supra note 4, at 870).
172. Cromwell Property Owners Ass'n v. Toffolon, 495 F. Supp. 915 (D. Conn. 1979).
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authorities, and the lack of any public opposition to the transportation
program.173 The court concluded that there was "no basis to find a
realistic potential for the degree of political entanglement that has ren-
dered other statutes unconstitutional."'' 74
In contrast to these opinions on the busing question, the Seventh
Circuit specifically found "a sufficient factual basis to conclude that a
serious potential of political divisiveness exists."' 175 In addition, it dis-
tinguished recent Supreme Court decisions validating various forms of
aid to parochial schools which would appear to raise the same political
divisiveness problem as that engendered by the CETA program.176 For
example, the court noted that providing uniform diagnostic services on
school premises by public employees to all school children, upheld by
the Supreme Court, 177 did not create as serious a potential for political
divisiveness as the CETA program.' 78 The court reasoned that a con-
troversy focusing on religion might be more likely to develop with the
CETA program which, rather than insuring uniform service to reli-
gious and nonreligious institutions alike, holds an annual competition
for CETA workers' services. 179 The distinction is a somewhat persua-
sive one, but it appears to be too slim a reed upon which to develop
new constitutional doctrine.
Thus far no courts of appeals have relied solely on the political
divisiveness factor to invalidate aid to parochial education; yet this case
involving CETA workers and a very special allocation mechanism per-
haps warranted the rather innovative position taken by the Seventh
Circuit. The major difficulty is that a "potential" for political divisive-
ness is too easily asserted. Decker should be read as a special case
where several factors coalesced: the program primarily benefited
church-related schools; the program required annual appropriations;
and the method of determining appropriations involved the entire com-
munity in debate. Thus, political fragmentation and divisiveness on
religious lines were likely to be intensified. Decker should be read in
this light and the court should proceed with caution in future cases to
require concrete evidence indicating that political divisiveness is a real
danger before it acts to invalidate programs.
173. Id at 925.
174. Id
175. 661 F.2d at 617 n.35.
176. Id at 617 n.36.
177. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
178. 661 F.2d at 617 n.36.
179. Id
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IV. DUE PROCESS
A. Substantive Due Process. The Right to Terminate Pregnancy
The Seventh Circuit decided only one noteworthy substantive due
process case this term.18 0 In Charles v. Carey,t8 ' it reviewed the consti-
tutionality of Illinois' newly amended abortion statute-"a statute of
daedalian complexity."'' 8 2 The most controversial aspect of the case
was the determination of the appropriate standard for reviewing laws
which regulate abortions. The defendants argued, based on Supreme
Court precedent, that the plaintiffs must first show an "undue burden"
placed on the abortion decision before the challenged law is subject to
strict scrutiny. 8 3 A close analysis of Supreme Court decisions reveals,
as the Seventh Circuit concluded, that "'undue burden' defines the ul-
timate constitutional issue, not merely the threshold requirement for
strict scrutiny."' 84 The court held that statutes which "burden" an in-
dividual's right to terminate pregnancy must be subjected to the same
strict scrutiny approach as is applied to statutes that prohibit the deci-
sion entirely. 8 5 Once plaintiff has established that the provision "bur-
dens" or "directly interferes" in the pregnancy termination decision,
the state must show a compelling basis for the law and that it is nar-
rowly drawn "to express only the legitimate interests at stake."' 8 6
Applying these legal principles to the Illinois law, the court held
180. Another case, Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981), addressed the question of
whether the conditions of confinement violated the due process rights of pretrial detainees being
held as "safekeepers" at a state prison in Indiana. Without characterizing it as substantive or
procedural, the court found "that the conditions of confinement amount to punishment of the
safekeepers and thus violate their rights to due process." Id at 494. By looking at all of the
challenged conditions cumulatively rather than separately, the court found the situation distin-
guishable from Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), and its earlier decision in Jordan v. Wolke,
615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs' case was aided by the fact that they were confined
"under conditions more burdensome than those imposed on the general population of convicted
felons" in the same institution. 641 F.2d at 494. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's treat-
ment this term of discrimination claims, see notes 299-409 infra and accompanying text.
181. 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
182. Id at 775.
183. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147
(1976); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976). In Maher, the
Court defined the scope of the fundamental right in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 117 (1973), as protect-
ing "the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide." Id at 473-74
(emphasis added). Some authorities have warned that this language may have diminished the
importance and altered the nature of the fundamental right recognized in Roe v. Wade. See Note,
Harris v. McRae: Whatever Happenedto the Roe v. Wade Abortion Right?, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
861, 892 (1981); Goldstein, A Critique of the Abortion Funding Decisions.- On Private Rights in the
Public Sector, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 313 (1981). The Seventh Circuit apparently rejects this
notion.
184. 627 F.2d at 777.
185. Id at 777-78.
186. Id at 777.
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that although an informed consent provision could validly be re-
quired, 8 7 various components of the statute constituted "an unconsti-
tutional 'straitjacket' on the physician's ability to counsel with his
patient."'' 88 The court found no compelling justification for requiring
(1) that the woman view state-prepared materials on the anatomical
and physiological features of the fetus at various gestational ages;
(2) that the physician inform the woman of the possibility of "organic
pain" to the fetus; (3) that the physician who performs the abortion
conduct the informed consent consultation himself and present the wo-
man with a true copy of her pregnancy test results; and (4) that a
twenty-four-hour mandatory waiting period transpire between the con-
sultation and the operation.'8 9
The court's refusal to impose an "undue burden" standard on the
plaintiff in abortion cases as well as its substantive holdings on in-
formed consent and waiting period requirements were recently fol-
lowed by the Sixth Circuit, overruling an earlier district court decision
upon which the defendant had relied in Carey.190 Court of appeals
decisions in the First and Eighth Circuits have also struck down similar
attempts "to regulate" the abortion decision. Applying a compelling
state interest standard, the Eighth Circuit in two recent cases invali-
dated waiting period requirements as well as burdensome informed
consent requirements.' 91 By requiring physicians to give patients infor-
mation contrary to their best judgment or medical opinion, the statutes
were held to interfere with the right of a woman to consult with her
physician regarding the abortion decision free from state interference:
"There is no rational reason, much less a compelling state interest, that
justifies forcing physicians to give women information that the physi-
187. Id at 782 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
In Danforth, the Supreme Court upheld a written consent requirement as imposing "no burden"
on the woman's decision and therefore not even triggering further constitutional analysis. The
Court defined a valid consent form as one simply providing information "as to just what would be
done and as to its consequences." 428 U.S. at 67 n.8.
188. 627 F.2d at 784.
189. Id at 781-82.
190. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir.
1981), rev'g 479 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979). The court applied a two-step analysis. First,
does the regulatory provision have a "legally significant impact" on the woman's right to termi-
nate her pregnancy? If so, does the provision serve a compelling state interest which does not
impose an "undue burden" on the abortion decision? 651 F.2d at 1204. The concurring opinion
rejected this two-step analysis as not justified by Supreme Court precedent and also criticized the
Seventh Circuit's analysis in Carey. 651 F.2d at 1215 & n.5 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
191. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.), supple-
mented after remand, 664 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1981); Women's Servs. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206 (8th
Cir. 1980).
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cians consider injurious to the woman's health or simply untrue."' 92
For similar reasons, the First Circuit granted a preliminary injunction
against a Massachusetts statute requiring a twenty-four-hour waiting
period as well as a description of development of the unborn child. 93
While upholding other aspects of its informed consent requirement, the
court reasoned that the information on fetal development was medi-
cally irrelevant and could cause emotional distress.' 94 Thus, the Sev-
enth Circuit opinion falls in line with the majority of federal courts on
abortion regulation questions.
Although recent Supreme Court decisions involving both abortion
funding195 and a minor's abortion decision 96 have cast some doubt on
the need to justify all abortion laws under a compelling interest stan-
dard, the Seventh Circuit was correct in rejecting these precedents. The
Court in the abortion funding cases stressed that the challenged statutes
did not place any limitations on the right to have an abortion; there-
fore, the government only had to demonstrate a rational relationship
between the decision not to fund and its decision to favor childbirth
over abortion. Although still recognizing that the government could
not interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, the Court found
no affirmative funding obligation to remove economic barriers. 197
As to the cases involving a minor's abortion decision, the Court
stressed the important considerations of family integrity and protecting
dependent adolescents, which are not at stake with the mature wo-
man. 9 8 Absent further guidance from the Supreme Court, the Seventh
192. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 868 (8th Cir.), sup-
plemented after remand, 664 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1981). Earlier, in Thone, the Eighth Circuit had
cited Carey to support its application of the strict scrutiny analysis. 636 F.2d at 210.
193. Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981). It should be noted
that the First Circuit, rather than applying the Carey approach, proceeded to balance the burdens
imposed and interests served by various aspects of the challenged consent form. Id at 1017-22.
As to the aspects of the provision the court found invalid, it specified that the required information
served no state interest at all. Id at 1022.
194. Id at 1021-23. See also Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S.
941 (1979); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.
Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980). Both Edwards and Olson, in addition to striking down informed con-
sent requirements, also invalidated mandatory waiting periods. Accord, Women's Community
Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542 (D. Me. 1979). But see Wolfe v. Schroering, 541
F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding a 24-hour requirement).
195. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
196. See cases cited note 198 infra.
197. In Maher, the Court stated, "There is a basic difference between direct state interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legisla-
tive policy." 432 U.S. at 475. The Court also emphasized that its decision "signals no retreat from
Roe [v. Wade] or the cases applying it." Id
198. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981) ("a 'mere requirement of parental notice'
does not violate the constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor"); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 637-39 (1979) (applying a rational relationship test to a statute alleged to impermissibly
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Circuit was thus correct in applying the strict scrutiny analysis origi-
nally set forth in Roe v. Wade:'99 "Where certain 'fundamental rights'
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights
may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' . . . and that leg-
islative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legiti-
mate state interests at stake. ' ' 200 Requiring plaintiffs to establish an
"undue burden" and permitting a court to initially determine when a
burden on the decision to abort becomes "undue" would be setting a
precedent dangerous to the protection traditionally afforded fundamen-
tal rights.20'
B. Procedural Due Process
Most of the Seventh Circuit's due process decisions concerned pro-
cedural due process and there were several cases of interest. These will
be examined in accordance with the well-established two-step analysis,
i e., whether there is a constitutionally protected liberty or property in-
terest 202 and, if so, what procedures are required.20 3 The inquiry rela-
tive to the first part of the analysis is found in several cases involving
federal statutory programs2°4 and several cases involving changes in
burden the right of a minor to an abortion); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 73 (1976) (same). See also Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006,
1012-13 (1st Cir. 1981) (same).
199. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
200. Id at 155 (citations omitted).
201. The only recent case which suggests that the Court may be retreating from strict scrutiny
analysis is Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind.
1980), aft'dmem sub noam. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Off, 451 U.S. 934 (1981),
upholding a provision requiring that all second trimester abortions be performed in a hospital.
The absence of an opinion from the Court is unfortunate, especially in light of contrary rulings on
the same question. See, e.g., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1980), rev'd in part and
remandedforfurtherproceedings, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.), supplemented after remand, 664 F.2d 687
(8th Cir. 1981). Presumably the Court adopted the defendant's position that the state's interest in
protecting maternal health, which becomes compelling by the second trimester, justified the re-
quirement, but it is, of course, unknown what standard of review the Court used in reaching its
conclusion. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) ("Because a summary affirmance is
an affirmance of the judgment only, the rationale of the affirmance may not be gleaned solely
from the opinion below.")
202. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
203. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
204. Three of these will be examined below: Uptown People's Community Health Servs. Bd.
of Directors v. Board of Comm'rs, 647 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1981); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261
(7th Cir. 1981); Davis v. Ball Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1980). A fourth,
Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1980), involved transfers of inmates from state to
federal prisons. The court found that, since 18 U.S.C. § 5003(a) (1976) requires a showing of need
for specialized treatment as a condition precedent to transfer, there is a protected liberty interest
absent such a determination. 637 F.2d at 1141. The removal of discretion from prison officials to
transfer for any or no reason distinguished Anthony from Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236
(1976), and Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). After Anthony was decided, the Supreme
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employment status.205
Holbrook v. Pit1206 was an action on behalf of tenants found eligi-
ble for a rent subsidy under section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937; as
amended by section 201(a) of the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974.207 The plaintiffs claimed a right to retroactive rent
subsidy payments as third-party beneficiaries of contracts executed be-
tween the United States Department'of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment 20 8 and the homeowners. Applying federal common law,20 9 the
court concluded that the plaintiffs had enforceable rights under the
contracts and that "HUD breached its obligation to properly adminis-
ter the Contracts, . . . and its coordinate responsibility to third-party
beneficiaries to fulfill the purposes of the Contracts, i.e., to provide full
assistance benefits to certified families. '210 Having decided that the
plaintiffs could recover retroactive benefits from HUD, the court ad-
dressed the question of whether due process "requires HUD to estab-
lish procedures to provide already certified tenants with notice and
opportunity to be heard concerning the provision of retroactive
benefits.",211
Based on the tenants' legitimate claim of entitlement as third-party
beneficiaries under the contracts, the court had little trouble in finding
a protected property interest. While it was recognized that the owner
would have discretion in the certification process and the initial selec-
tion of tenants, once tenants were certified they had an entitlement to
the benefits under the terms implied in the contract.212 The case was
remanded to the district court for a determination of the "precise con-
tours of the requirements of procedural due process in the context of
Court, in Howe v. Smith, 101 S. Ct. 2468 (1981), held that § 5003(a) does not limit transfers to
inmates needing specialized treatment.
205. Margoles v. Tormey, 643 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1981); Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d
1208 (7th Cir. 1980); Elbert v. Board of Educ., 630 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1031 (1981); Gaballah v. Johnson, 629 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1980).
206. 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1434f (1976).
208. Hereinafter referred to as HUD.
209. The court distinguished Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), in concluding that
federal common law would apply; the court referred to the fact that a federal agency was a party
and that the outcome of the case would directly affect substantial financial obligations of the
United States. 643 F.2d at 1270 n.16.
210. 643 F.2d at 1276.
211. Id
212. In a lengthy footnote, the court indicated that the plaintiffs, at a minimum, had a claim
which "must be deemed to be that ofapplicants for retroactive benefits" and cited numerous cases
in support of the proposition that "[applicants who have met the objective eligibility criteria of a
wide variety of governmental programs have been held to be entitled to protection under the due
process clause." Id at 1278 n.35 (emphasis in original).
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this case."' 213 The court did indicate that it would require, at a mini-
mum, that all tenants receive prompt notice of their right to receive
retroactive payments, a written statement setting forth the reasons for
any denial of retroactive benefits, the opportunity to challenge the suffi-
ciency of HUD's reasons and a hearing before the benefits are finally
denied. 214
In Davis v. Ball Memorial HospilalAsociation,215 a case involving
benefits under the Hill-Burton Act,216 the plaintiffs asserted due process
violations resulting from the federal and state defendants' failure to
require medical facilities to notify them of the availability of uncom-
pensated services, to give reasons for the denial of an application for
such services and to provide an opportunity for a hearing. Under the
Hill-Burton Act, which provides federal financial assistance for the
construction and modernization of medical facilities, a facility receiv-
ing federal funds has to give assurances that it will provide "a reason-
able volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor" to the extent
that the financial condition of the facility permits.217 New regulations
adopted by the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare mooted several of the plaintiffs' procedural claims; however,
they did not provide for a hearing as requested by the plaintiffs. 21 8 In
addressing the question whether the plaintiffs had a protected property
interest, the court noted the resemblance to Goldberg v. Kely 2 19 in that
the federal regulations set out specific eligibility requirements. An im-
portant distinguishing element, however, made the due process inquiry
much more difficult: under the Hill-Burton regulations, not every ap-
plicant meeting the eligibility criteria would necessarily be entitled to
assistance. This is true because medical facilities were required to pro-
vide uncompensated services only up to a certain percentage of either
operating costs or the federal funds received. 220 Thus, there was no
assurance that an eligible applicant would actually receive free services.
Nevertheless, the court found that the plaintiffs had an enforce-
able, protected property interest in the medical facilities' compliance
213. Id at 1281.
214. Id
215. 640 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1980).
216. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
217. Id § 291c(e).
218. The court held that a plaintiff seeking to establish due process procedures does not have
to allege that "he or she actually sought each particular procedure due process requires." 640 F.2d
at 37.
219. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
220. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1330, 1338-40 (7th Cir. 1980) (Pell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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with the assurances provided under the Act.22' In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court relied heavily on the analysis in Judge Hufstedler's dis-
sent in Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage
Investors :222
An entitlement is a legally enforceable interest in receiving a govern-
mentally conferred benefit, the initial receipt or the termination of
which is conditioned upon the existence of a controvertible and con-
troverted fact. Such an interest cannot be impaired or destroyed
without prior notice to the beneficiary and a meaningful opportunity
for him to be heard for the purpose of resolving the factual issue.223
In Davis, the enforceable right or interest was found through a close
examination of the Hill-Burton Act and its history. Two factors were
considered important. First, the fact that the Act gave the plaintiffs
standing to sue the medical facilities was "an initial index of an en-
forceable interest. ' '224 In other words, the "requirement of some en-
forceable interest is 'akin' to the requirement of standing. ' 225 Second,
the court pointed to the plaintiffs' private right of action to sue the
medical facilities. 226 This "almost by definition, reflects the very sort of
Congressional intendment to confer some enforceable interest upon
these beneficiaries that Judge Hufstedler regarded as indicative of this
first element of a protectible property interest. 227
Regarding Judge Hufstedler's requirement that an enforceable in-
terest be conditioned "upon the existence of one or more controvertible
and controverted facts, '228 ie., the "practical side of due process, '229
the court found that questions concerning an applicant's initial eligibil-
ity would supply this element. 230 It was concerned, however, about the
practicality of a hearing because the need to prove that the particular
medical facility had not met its financial obligations for the year could
turn the hearing into full-scale litigation.23' This apparent dilemma
was resolved on the basis of the Act and regulations which anticipate
that claimants would ordinarily have to demonstrate only their eligibil-
ity and that only in the uncommon case would the facility seek to show
221. 640 F.2d at 43.
222. 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974).
223. Id at 495-96 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
224. 640 F.2d at 42.
225. Id at 41-42.
226. Id at 42.
227. Id
228. See text accompanying note 223 supra.
229. 640 F.2d at 43. A factual dispute is needed to serve the practical side of due process
because absent such a dispute notice and a hearing would be "pointless." Id at 41.
230. Id at 42-43.
231. Id at 42.
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exhaustion of its yearly compliance requirement.232 Having reduced
the practical concern in this way, the court found that the enforceable
interest in the facilities' compliance with their assurances under the
Hill-Burton Act reached entitlement status.233 It remanded to the dis-
trict court the question of what process is due.234
Uptown People's Community Health Services Board of Directors v.
Board of Commissioners235 also involved a search for a protected prop-
erty interest in the context of a federal statutory program. Pursuant to
an agreement between the Health and Hospitals Governing Commis-
sion and the Health Services Board of Directors, the Board had estab-
lished and operated a community outpatient health clinic in the
Uptown area of Chicago. When the Commission indicated its inten-
tion to divorce itself from the Board and run the clinic on its own until
a new Board could be created, suit was filed alleging breach of contract
and a violation of due process. Since the only jurisdictional basis for
deciding the contractual claim was pendent jurisdiction, the court indi-
cated that the first question to be answered was whether the plaintiffs
had alleged a substantial federal claim.236 This led to an inquiry of
whether the plaintiff Health Services Board had a constitutionally pro-
tected property right.
After examining the agreement very closely, the court concluded
that it simply did not create an entitlement to continue operating the
clinic indefinitely. 237 While the agreement reflected the Commission's
interest in having locally operated clinics and the Board's desire to run
a clinic independently, the "expression of a goal and the desire to attain
it does not, however, rise to the level of an explicit mutual expectancy
that the Board is entitled to acquire the clinic for its exclusive use upon
meeting the agreement's conditions. '238
Several employment cases also dealt with the question of whether
there was a protected interest triggering due process requirements. In
Gaballah v. Johnson,239 a doctor employed by the Veterans Administra-
tion 240 was dropped from a GS-13 position to a GS-9 position as a
232. Id at 43.
233. Id
234. Id In reaching its conclusion the Seventh Circuit found unpersuasive the district court
opinion in Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978). Newsom was sub-
sequently reversed. 653 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1981).
235. 647 F.2d 727 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 102 S. Ct. 328 (1981).
236. 647 F.2d at 732-33.
237. Id at 738.
238. Id at 735 (emphasis in original).
239. 629 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1980). See also text accompanying notes 364-68 infra.
240. Hereinafter referred to as VA.
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result of a general reduction in workforce. During a three-year period
subsequent to his demotion, five positions became available at GS-II
or -12 levels. Gaballah was qualified for each job, had a right under
VA regulations to be considered for each position before it was posted
and had a right to receive written reasons if he was not selected. Nev-
ertheless, he did not receive any of the jobs; in fact, he received no prior
consideration and did not receive written reasons indicating why he
was not selected.
Concerning the irregularities in filling those positions, the court
found that the plaintiff did not have a protected right to be promoted
nor did he have a property interest in any particular form of considera-
tion for promotion.24' It was also noted that a violation of the agency's
general procedural rules relating to promotions did not create any per-
sonal rights, either substantive or procedural, for the plaintiff.242
Rather, the court decided that the rules were intended to "protect only
the generalized interest in filling positions with the best qualified per-
sonnel in the agency" and that this interest "belongs as much to the
agency and the public in general as it does to Gaballah. ' 243 However,
the court did find that the agency rules providing that a demoted em-
ployee be given preferential consideration for promotions for which he
is qualified did "confer important procedural benefits upon [Gabal-
lah].''244 These rules were "viewed as creating a legitimate claim of
entitlement to promotion absent the articulation of some valid written
reason for non-selection, ' 245 and the failure to follow the rules violated
Gaballah's property rights.246
241. 629 F.2d at 1202. His position was found similar to that of a nontenured assistant profes-
sor who had no property right in a promotion. McElearney v. University of Illinois, 612 F.2d 285,
291 (7th Cir. 1979).
242. 629 F.2d at 1202-03.
243. Id at 1203.
244. Id
245. Id Compare this to the holding in Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 415 (1981), to the effect that regulations
which require consideration of various factors prior to transferring a prisoner, establish
procedures for the exercise of discretion, but they do not limit the decision to transfer to
any particular reason. Without such a limitation, the regulations do not recognize any
right on the part of the prisoner to serve in a particular institution.
643 F.2d at 1290 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976)). In Wakinekona v. Olim,
664 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1981), the court held that Hawaii prison regulations defining an interstate
transfer as a "grievous loss" and requiring a prior hearing before an impartial committee give rise
to a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id at 711-12. Breach of a statute regarding notice,
resulting in some delay in the notice, was not deemed a violation of due process in United States v.
Warden, Stateville Correctional Center, 635 F.2d 656, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1980).
246. The dismissal of this claim was nevertheless affirmed because the officials responsible for
providing preferential consideration were not named as defendants. See generally notes 475-83
ihfra and accompanying text.
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Three of the employment cases involved the application of Board
of Regents v. Roth 247 and Paul v. Davis248 to situations where changes
in employment status were accompanied by damage to reputation. In
the first, Endicott v. Huddleston ,249 the plaintiff was found not to have a
property interest in continued employment as supervisor of assessments
because state law guaranteed him only one four-year term and not re-
appointment.250 State law granted such an incumbent a public hearing
"on the question of why he is not to be reappointed,"' 25' but the pur-
pose of this was to provide an opportunity to preserve his reputation,
not to save his job.252 Thus, the right to such a hearing did not create a
property interest. However, the plaintiff was found to have a liberty
interest because several of the reasons for his nonappointment
impugned his honesty and integrity.253 Under Roth and Paul, such
damage to reputation, without more, does not infringe upon a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest. The Seventh Circuit found, however,
that the "conjunction of stigma to reputation and failure to rehire" did
rise to the level of a protected liberty interest;254 thus, the plaintiff was
entitled to notice and a hearing affording him an opportunity to clear
his name.255
Defamatory statements signifying interference with a liberty inter-
est were also involved in Elbert v. Board of Education.256 In Elbert, the
plaintiff school superintendent was notified that his contract would not
be renewed, in part because of an alleged misuse of public funds. Sev-
eral months after voting to terminate the plaintiff, a new board of edu-
cation reversed the decision and voted to offer him a contract for the
following school year. At the same time, a public statement was issued
indicating that, while the plaintiff had made some errors of judgment,
he had not misused public funds. Because there was no actual break in
his employment, it was found that no property right was infringed.257
247. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
248. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
249. 644 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir. 1980).
250. Id at 1214.
251. Id
252. Id
253. Id at 1215.
254. Id at 1216.
255. Id A second public hearing had been held and it satisfied the procedural requirements
of due process. However, because the first hearing did not comport with due process, the plaintiff
was entitled to recover damages for any loss suffered as a result of the first inadequate hearing.
Such damages amounted to his attorney's fees expended in obtaining a second hearing. Id at
1216-17. See also Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870 (lst Cir. 1981).
256. 630 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S 1031 (1981).
257. 630 F.2d at 512.
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The court found the alleged infringement of his liberty interest result-
ing from the defamation to be controlled by Paul.258 Thus, absent an
actual loss of employment, there was nothing more than an alleged def-
amation alone. Deprivation of a liberty interest requires "stigma plus,"
ie., the stigma must be accompanied by an actual loss of em-
ployment. 259
The final case involving "stigma plus," Margoles v. Tormey, 260
concerned an applicant for a medical license in Illinois who claimed
that a letter from the defendant Wisconsin officials, misrepresenting
that he had been convicted of attempting to bribe a judge, severely
prejudiced his application and contributed to the denial of his license.
Even assuming the plaintiff proved a stigma resulting from the defen-
dants' correspondence,
the "stigma plus" test is not satisfied. Plaintiff has failed to prove
that these defendants were connected with any denial of a govern-
ment benefit or privilege, i.e. licensure. The affiliation between
stigma and denial of a government benefit is absent. Although de-
fendants' actions may have imposed a stigma on plaintiffs reputa-
tion, plaintiffs claim fails to establish that defendants' defamation
was "in conjunction" with the denials of licensure in Illinois. The
Illinois authorities and the Illinois denials of licensure were separate
and distinct from any defamatory statements made by these Wiscon-
sin officials. 261
These three "stigma plus" cases generally represent an affirmation
and application of the test as stated earlier by the Seventh Circuit in
Colaizzi v. Walker:262
[S]tigma to reputation (not itself a deprivation of liberty as defined in
the Fourteenth Amendment) plus failure to rehire or discharge (not
necessarily involving deprivation of property as defined in the Four-
teenth Amendment) may nevertheless when found in conjunction
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest without due process. 263
Probably the most disturbing aspect of these cases is the majority's re-
fusal in Elbert to recognize the negative impact of the defamation on
the plaintiffs opportunities for other employment as satisfying the
258. Id at 513.
259. A claimed loss of a liberty interest failed in Gaballah for the same reason. 629 F.2d at
1202. The dissent in Elbert would have found the required "plus" in the superintendent's allega-
tions that his employment opportunities elsewhere were negatively affected and that he was unsuc-
cessful in finding employment elsewhere after the announcement of his termination. 630 F.2d at
514-15 (Baker, J., dissenting).
260. 643 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1981).
261. Id at 1299 (emphasis in original).
262. 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 960 (1977).
263. 542 F.2d at 973 (emphasis in original).
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"plus" requirement.264
The reasoning behind Paul, ie., the unwillingness to "make the
Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may already be administered by the States, 265
played a role in a recent Supreme Court decision concerning the negli-
gent handling of a prisoner's property which arrived at the institution
by mail. In Parratt v. Taylor,266 the Court recognized that the plain-
tiff's claim satisfied three prerequisites of a valid due process claim, 267
but indicated that these do not establish a violation of the fourteenth
amendment unless the available state tort remedies fail to satisfy the
requirements of procedural due process.268 After stating that prior
cases do not always require a hearing before the initial deprivation of
property,269 the Court found that the state tort remedies "could have
fully compensated the [plaintiff] for the property loss" and were, there-
fore, "sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. ' 270 Thus,
there was no violation of the due process clause.
Parratt represents the second level of analysis required in proce-
dural due process cases, i e., assuming a protected interest, what process
is due? In Parratt, only postdeprivation procedures were required, at
least in part because it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the state
to provide a meaningful hearing before the unauthorized taking by
state agents.271
The timing of the hearing was also at issue before the Seventh
Circuit this term in Ciechon v. City of Chicago ,272 where the parties
stipulated that firefighters who were suspended because they were not
residents of Chicago have a protected property interest which cannot be
taken without due process. 273 Based on a balancing of the three factors
established by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge27 4-the pri-
264. See 630 F.2d at 514-15 (Baker, J., dissenting).
265. 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
266. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
267. "[Tihe petitioners acted under color of state law; the hobby kit falls within the definition
of property; and the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation." Id
at 536-37.
268. Id at 537.
269. Id at 540.
270. Id at 544.
271. The taking was deemed unauthorized because it was the result of the agents' failure to
follow established state procedures. Id
272. 634 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1980).
273. Id at 1058. But see Wren v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1980), in which prelayoff
hearings were not required when layoffs were based on fiscal restraints rather than political moti-
vations. Id at 1288.
274. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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vate interest which will be affected, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of this interest, and the governmental interest27 5 -the Seventh Circuit
concluded that a presuspension hearing was not required. 276 The only
question remanded to the district court was whether the city procedures
assured a prompt postsuspension hearing as required by due process.
In balancing the Mathews factors, the court stated,
The City has an important interest in enforcing its ordinances; the
initial decision to suspend is based on internal investigation results
and documentary evidence which is reviewed at three levels before
suspension is imposed, and the postsuspension procedure provides
for a full evidentiary hearing; the effect on the private interest (inter-
venors' entitlement to their salaries and employee benefits) is mini-
mized by the recovery of back-pay and full restoration to rank that
intervenors will receive if they ultimately prevail.277
This case is also worth noting for its discussion of the role of a
preliminary injunction in employment suspension cases. 278 The lower
court had issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the suspensions;
this was the basis for the appeal.279 After noting that appellate review
of an order granting a preliminary injunction is limited and will be set
aside only where there is an abuse of discretion,280 the court disagreed
with the lower court's finding "that loss of wages, employee benefits,
and opportunities for promotion during the suspension period consti-
tuted irreparable injury."' 28' Relying in part on the Supreme Court de-
cision in Sampson v. Murray,2 s2 the court held that the losses did not
result in irreparable harm because the firefighters could ultimately re-
ceive back pay and restoration to their respective ranks if successful at
their hearings.28 3 This reasoning would be questionable if a plaintiff
275. Id at 334-35.
276. 634 F.2d at 1059.
277. Id In reaching this conclusion the court relied in part on Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55
(1979). Judge Sprecher, however, dissented on the basis of Barry, arguing that "the city's interest
in suspending a non-resident but experienced firefighter is so appreciably less than New York's
interest in upholding the integrity of horse racing and gambling thereon, that this case also consti-
tutionally warrants apresuspension hearing." 634 F.2d at 1062 (Sprecher, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
278. Three other civil rights cases in the Seventh Circuit this term involved review of a lower
court ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction. See O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 645 F.2d
578 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981); EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th
Cir. 1980); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
279. The appeal was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976). Two other cases, Davis v. Ball
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F.2d 30, 34-36 (7th Cir. 1980), and Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d
600, 602 (7th Cir. 1980), addressed at some length the appealability of orders denying preliminary
injunctions.
280. 634 F.2d at 1057.
281. Id
282. 415 U.S. 61 (1974).
283. 634 F.2d at 1057-58.
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makes a showing that the loss of employment has an impact broader
than the loss of wages, e.g., loss of resources necessary to obtain the
basic necessities of life.
Several other Seventh Circuit decisions this term addressed the na-
ture of the process which is due once it is determined that a protected
interest exists. Again relying on the Mathews factors,284 the court in
Holbrook v. Pi11285 held that the tenants must receive prompt notifica-
tion of their right to receive retroactive benefits and a written statement
setting forth the reasons for any denial of such benefits with an indica-
tion of how to challenge the sufficiency of the agency's reasons.286 The
importance of a statement of findings or evidence and the reasons for
the agency ruling was stressed in several cases. In Busche v. Burkee,287
the justification for such a statement was given as follows:
A written statement by factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for its decision serves several interests. It allows for more
effective review of the factfinder's decision, helps to insure that the
factfinder acts fairly, and protects the subject of the inquiry from
"collateral consequences based on a misunderstanding of the nature
of the original proceeding.- 288
In Chavis v. Rowe, 289 the court held that the right to a written statement
giving the facts relied on and the reasons for conclusions reached was
so clearly established that the defendant prison officials were not enti-
tled to a qualified immunity.290 The failure to make an appropriate
administrative record was also fatal to the defendants in Hayes v.
Thompson.29' The court emphasized that the prison disciplinary com-
mittee's reasons, both for denying witnesses 292 and for a finding of
guilty, must appear in the administrative record.293 It is not sufficient
to supply the reasons through testimony and subsequent judicial pro-
284. See text accompanying note 275 supra.
285. 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cit. 1981). See notes 206-14 supra and accompanying text.
286. 643 F.2d at 1281.
287. 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981).
288. 649 F.2d at 516 (quoting Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974)). For an example
of an acceptable statement of the evidence relied upon, see United States v. Warden, Stateville
Correctional Center, 635 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1980).
289. 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 415 (1981).
290. 643 F.2d at 1288. As to another due process violation in Chavis, the failure to inform the
plaintiff of the substance of an investigatory report containing exculpatory evidence, the court
found that the right was not so clearly established and the defendants were therefore entitled to
prove that they acted in good faith. Id at 1289.
291. 637 F.2d 483, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1980).
292. The right to call witnesses at administrative hearings involving prison discipline is not
absolute; this was made clear in Gibson v. McEvers, 631 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1980), in which the
court indicated there was no right to call witnesses to present evidence when "only lesser penalties
were imposed." Id at 98.
293. 637 F.2d at 488.
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ceedings. Such after-the-fact explanations are suspicious because they
do not protect the inmate from arbitrary official action and only an
adequate administrative record enables the inmate to make an intelli-
gent decision as to whether judicial review should be sought.
The importance of the three factors identified in Mathews in deter-
mining what process is due was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in Little v. Streater.294 In Little, application of the Mathews fac-
tors led to the conclusion that Connecticut paternity proceedings re-
sulted in a denial of due process in the case of an indigent defendant
who could not meet the cost of blood tests.295 The private interests
were found to be substantial because of the potential support obliga-
tion, possible sanctions for noncompliance and the creation of an im-
portant parent-child relationship. 296 Because of the reliability of the
scientific blood test evidence, particularly in relation to other types of
evidence in paternity actions, the risk of an erroneous determination is
not inconsiderable. While the state has an obvious interest in the wel-
fare of children born out of wedlock and in securing support for such
children, it also wants accurate and just paternity determinations. The
state's monetary interest in avoiding the cost of blood tests was not sig-
nificant enough to overcome the private interests.297 Therefore, the
Court concluded that without blood test evidence, the indigent defen-
dant was not provided "a meaningful opportunity to be heard. '298
While the required two-step analysis remains clear, the decisions
of both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court continue to demon-
strate the flexibility of procedural due process requirements and the
need for careful case-by-case application of the two-step analysis.
V. SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION
The Seventh Circuit decided several cases this term involving dis-
crimination litigation. The court generally followed well-established
principles laid down in previous Supreme Court decisions to handle the
constitutional as well as the federal statutory issues it faced. 299
294. 452 U.S. I (1981).
295. Id at 12.
296. Id at 13.
297. Id at 16.
298. Id Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (Mathews fac-
tors might require appointment of counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights; there must
be a case-by-case application of the factors by the trial courts).
299. In a nondiscrimination decision arising under the equal protection clause, the Seventh
Circuit applied traditional rational basis analysis in upholding a provision under Illinois' Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. In Mandley v. Quern, 635 F.2d 659 (7th
Cir. 1980), the plaintiffs challenged the "special needs" provision of the program which pays bene-
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A. Sex Discrimination. Separate But Equal
Perhaps the most controversial equal protection decision handed
down by the court this term was O'Connor v. Board of Education300 in
which a sixth grade girl challenged her exclusion from the boys' basket-
ball team. The district court had issued a preliminary injunction based
on its finding that the school's classification violated O'Connor's funda-
mental "right to develop" as well as her fundamental right to an educa-
tion.301 Although the district court had recognized the school's
compelling interest in maximizing participation in sports, the district
court judge concluded that the program was not the least restrictive
means by which its interests could be protected. Thus, it found that
O'Connor had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits war-
ranting a preliminary injunction. 302
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had
abused its discretion; it had erred primarily in using a strict scrutiny
standard because the Seventh Circuit recognized no right to personal
development nor any fundamental right to an education which would
trigger the stricter review.30 3 The court instead applied the well-estab-
lished gender-based discrimination test requiring the state to show im-
portant governmental objectives and that the means are substantially
fits to AFDC families under certain enumerated emergency circumstances. The plaintiffs argued
that the provision should also cover other special need circumstances, namely theft of cash, evic-
tion for nonpayment of rent, termination of utility services or loss or delay of AFDC checks. The
Seventh Circuit held that there was no constitutional right to obtain welfare from the government
and since the plaintiffs have no fundamental "right to survive," the provision only had to with-
stand rational basis analysis in order to be deemed constitutional. Id at 661. The court easily
found a rational basis for the provisions of the program and upheld its validity. The decision falls
in line with a series of Supreme Court cases upholding various aspects of the government welfare
program. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding Maryland's monthly
ceiling on AFDC grants to individual families, regardless of family size or need). But see Bacon v.
Toia, 648 F.2d 801 (2d Cir.),prob.juris. noted, 102 S. Ct. 969 (1981), in which the Second Circuit
held that a provision of New York's emergency assistance program denying emergency aid (1) to
persons eligible for or receiving AFDC grants and (2) in cases where the emergency arose from
the loss, theft or mismanagement of a regular public assistance grant violated the equal protection
clause. The court concluded that the line-drawing process did not rest "on a rational foundation."
648 F.2d at 809.
Perhaps more noteworthy was the Seventh Circuit's decision in Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488
(7th Cir. 1981), in which the court did find a violation of equal protection resulting from the
"significantly more burdensome conditions" imposed on pretrial detainees as compared to con-
victed prisoners. Although applying the very lenient rational basis standard, the court could find
no rational justification for the different treatment. Id at 498. This conclusion is significant be-
cause the Supreme Court has on only a few occasions found that the rational basis standard could
not be met. See TIBE, supra note 4, at 996-99.
300. 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981).
301. 645 F.2d at 579.
302. Id
303. Id at 580-81.
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related to the achievement of those objectives.304 The court determined
that the teams for boys and girls were equal in terms of funding, facili-
ties and other objective criteria, and that " 'separate but equal' teams
have received endorsement in many circuits. ' 30 5 It found, as had the
district court, that maximization of participation in sports did consti-
tute a compelling justification for the separate teams, and it therefore
concluded that the sex-based classification substantially furthered an
important government objective, thus satisfying the equal protection
clause. 30 6 Again noting that it was simply reviewing the correctness of
the preliminary injunction, the court held that the defendants had suffi-
ciently demonstrated that their programs substantially served the ob-
jective of increasing girls' participation in sports.30 7
The question of "separate but equal" facilities for boys and girls is
not new in the courts. In Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadel-
phia,30 8 the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether
Philadelphia could maintain sex-segregated secondary schools for aca-
demically gifted boys and girls. The Court split four-to-four, illustrat-
ing the uncertainty in this area.309 The most troublesome part of the
O'Connor case was its reliance upon Justice Stevens' earlier opinion in
the case denying a petition to vacate a stay of the order the district
court had granted.310 Justice Stevens had concluded that the girls' pro-
gram would offer O'Connor opportunities that were equal in all re-
spects to the advantages she would gain from the higher level of
competition in the boys' program. He remarked, "If the classification is
reasonable in substantially all of its applications, I do not believe that
the general rule can be said to be unconstitutional simply because it
appears arbitrary in an individual case."'3 11 This approach was forecast
in earlier opinions of Justice Stevens,312 as well as those of Justice
304. Id at 580 (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980), and Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)).
305. 645 F.2d at 581.
306. Id at 580.
307. Id at 581.
308. 430 U.S. 703 (1977), aff'g by an equally divided court 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
309. See generally Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amend-
ments, 1979 WAsH. U.L.Q. 161, 170-72; Note, Broadening Access to the Courts and Clarifying Judi-
cial Standards.- Sex Discrimination Cases in the 1978-1979 Supreme Court Term, 14 U. RiCH. L.
REv. 515, 581-83 (1980).
310. 449 U.S. 1301 (Stevens, Circuit Justice, 1980).
311. Id at 1306.
312. Justice Stevens denounced the majority approach to sex discrimination questions in Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-14 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). He later stated that the only ap-
propriate question was whether or not persons similarly situated with reference to the law are
similarly treated. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 219 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Stewart. In Parham v. Hughes,3 13 for example, Justice Stewart noted
that invidious discrimination is proved where a statute is "premised
upon overbroad generalizations and [excludes] all members of one sex
even though they [are] similarly situated with- members of the other
sex."' 314 In the absence of such "invidious discrimination," the statute
only has to be rationally related to a permissible state objective in order
to pass constitutional muster.315
This analysis would support the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in
O'Connor, but Parham was only a plurality opinion. In fact, in the
companion case of Caban v. Mohammed,31 6 Justices Stewart and Ste-
vens found themselves dissenting in a case very similar to Parham.
Justice Stewart argued in dissent that if men and women are not in fact
similarly situated in the area covered by the legislation in question,
then the equal protection clause is not violated.31 7 Justice Stevens went
a step further, stating that if the statute was justified in its most fre-
quent application, then a presumption of validity should arise.318 The
Stevens-Stewart analysis, which thus far has not been adopted by a ma-
jority 9n the Court, would permit application of a rational basis stan-
dard upon a finding that men and women were not "similarly
situated." Even if plaintiffs survive this initial barrier, Justice Stevens
would require them to show that its application was invidious in a suffi-
cient number of cases to justify invalidation.319
The problem with this analysis is that the core of equal protection
is its preservation of the right to be treated as an individual rather than
313. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
314. Id at 356-57. In Parham, Justice Stewart concluded that mothers and fathers of illegiti-
mate children are not similarly situated so that a statute treating them differently did not work an
invidious discrimination. Id at 355. This approach was relied upon in the plurality opinion of
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981), in upholding Califor-
nia's gender-based statutory rape law. In the Court's most recent sex discrimination case, Rostker
v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981), Justice Rehnquist made two troubling statements in his opin-
ion upholding the male-only military draft registration: (1) that men and women, because of
combat restrictions on women, are "not similarly situated" for purposes of a draft, and (2) that
the exemption of women "is not only sufficiently but closely related to Congress' purpose in au-
thorizing registration." Id at 2658. The latter suggests that something less than a substantial
relationship between means and end will be used to justify sex discrimination. However, Justice
Rehnquist's emphasis on the special deference to Congress required in the area of national de-
fense and military affairs, especially where, as here, Congress in special hearings extensively con-
sidered the question of military need, id at 2651-60, should minimize the precedential weight of
the opinion.
315. 441 U.S. at 357.
316. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
317. Id at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
318. Id at 410-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
319. See text accompanying note 310 supra.
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as a member of a particular group.320 The injustice is apparent in the
O'Connor case. The whole point of the lawsuit was to demonstrate that
O'Connor was not the typical sixth grade girl. The facts indicated that
a professional basketball coach who had observed her play rated her
ability to be equal to or better than a female high school sophomore
and equal to that of a male eighth grade player.32' The lower court had
concluded that the boys' and girls' basketball teams were unequal be-
cause O'Connor's competition with girls of substantially lesser skill was
not as valuable as competition with persons of equal or better skills in
the boys' program.322 The Seventh Circuit nonetheless supported its
decision by reference to Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.323 Although Title IX bars discrimination on the basis of sex in
educational programs, the regulations promulgated under it expressly
permit separate teams as well as the exclusion of girls from contact
sports, including basketball. 324 Justice Stevens had also relied upon
these provisions as indicating a strong probability that the gender-
based classification could be adequately justified.325 The one district
court decision to strike down the regulations as unconstitutional was
recently overturned by the Siith Circuit.326 Thus, at least for the pres-
ent, it appears unlikely that claims of discrimination based on sex-seg-
regated athletic teams involving contact sports can be successfully
attacked. As to the broader question of the standard to be used in sex
discrimination cases, the Seventh Circuit should reject the regressive
Stevens-Stewart approach in favor of the principles enunciated in Craig
320. See TRIBE, mupra note 4, at 1012.
321. 645 F.2d at 579.
322. Id
323. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
324. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1976). Note that lower federal courts have divided on the issue of
whether females must be permitted to participate with males in contact sports. In Fortin v. Dar-
lington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975), the court held that 8- to 12-year-old girls
must be allowed to play little league baseball. See also Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletics Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (issuing an injunction against the enforcement
of a rule prohibiting high school girls from playing varsity baseball); Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F.
Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (granting a temporary restraining order against a rule of a Cleveland
football league prohibiting girls from playing). But see Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Ass'n,
444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978), and Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977).
Both courts struck down rules prohibiting female participation in contact sports, but noted that
plaintiffs' demands for relief would be satisfied by "separate but equal" female programs. See
generally Note, Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine- Applied to State and Federal Regulations Ex-
cluding Females From Contact Sports, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 197, 206-08 (1979).
325. 449 U.S. 1301 (Stevens, Circuit Justice, 1980).
326. Yellow Springs v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'g
443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978). In Yellow Springs, the court relied in part on Justice Stewart's
dissent in Caban, see text accompanying note 317 supra. 647 F.2d at 657. While refusing to fully
adjudicate the constitutional issue in light of the sparse record, the court did make clear that it was
reversing the district court's ruling of unconstitutionality. Id at 657 n.4.
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v. Boren.327 If the court fails to do this, many of the gains made thus
far in recognizing the injustice of sex discrimination will be erased.
B. Title IX Intent Required
Another significant sex discrimination decision this term was Can-
non v. University of Chicago .328 In the same case, the Supreme Court
had reversed an earlier Seventh Circuit ruling329 that a private right of
action does not exist under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.330 Defendants had filed renewed motions to dismiss the com-
plaint, this time on the ground that Title IX prohibits only intentional
discrimination and that the appellant had failed to allege such pur-
poseful conduct by the defendants in her complaint. 33' The plaintiff's
suit was based upon the admission policies of the Pritzker School of
Medicine at the University of Chicago, which discouraged individuals
over the age of thirty from applying, and Northwestern University
Medical School, which flatly prohibited the admission of any applicant
over the age of thirty-five who did not possess an advanced academic
degree. At the time of her application, Cannon was thirty-nine years
old and had no such degree. She alleged that because women histori-
cally interrupt their higher education to pursue a family and other
domestic responsibilities more often than men, the age policies dispa-
rately affect women resulting in sex discrimination violative of Title
IX.332
Relying on the Supreme Court's admonition in its earlier Cannon
decision that Title VP33 should provide guidance regarding the proper
interpretation of Title IX, the Seventh Circuit focused its attention on
recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title VI. Looking to state-
ments in such recent decisions as Regents of the University of Calfornia
v. Bakke,334 Fullilove v. Klutznick 335 and Board of Education v. Har-
ris, 336 the Seventh Circuit concluded that seven members of the
Supreme Court, as well as many lower federal courts, now accept the
view that a violation of Title VI requires intentional discrimination.
337
327. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See text accompanying note 304 supra.
328. 648 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1981).
329. 441 U.S. 677 (1979), rey'g 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976).
330. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
331. 648 F.2d at 1105.
332. Id
333. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
334. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
335. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
336. 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
337. 648 F.2d at 1108. In addition to the Supreme Court cases cited by the Seventh Circuit,
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Applying that same standard to the Title IX allegations made in Can-
non's complaint, the court noted that she failed to allege that the de-
fendant medical schools were purposefully or intentionally
discriminating against her because of her sex.338 Cannon's cause of ac-
tion was based solely upon the alleged disparate impact the defendants'
age policies had upon women. Relying upon Supreme Court prece-
dent339 under the fourteenth amendment, the court concluded that the
claim of disparate impact, even when coupled with allegations that the
defendants knew of this impact while enforcing their age policies, was
deemed insufficient to establish a violation of Title IX.34° The court
concluded, "An illegal intent to discriminate cannot be posited solely
upon a mere failure to equalize an apparent disparate impact."' 34'
Since the court could not infer from the plaintiffs allegations that dis-
criminatory considerations were in any way involved in the defendants'
actions, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a claim.342
The Cannon complaint was originally filed in 1975-at a time
when Title VI was still generally understood to create a cause of action
for disparate impact.343 Thus it is not surprising that the plaintiff failed
to allege anything suggesting intentional discrimination. Nonetheless,
the subsequent decisions in Washington v. Davis,344 and especially in
see Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981) (intent is an essential element under Title
VI); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980) (the closing of a city hospital must be shown to
have been intentionally discriminatory); Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980)
(assignment of handicapped children to special schools must be shown to be intentionally discrim-
inatory); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Title VI should be held to impose the intentional discrimination standard, at least in school dis-
crimination cases). But see NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (dispa-
rate impact, without showing intentional discrimination, is sufficient to establish a prima facie case
that a federally aided medical center reorganized and relocated its facilities in violation of Title
VI); De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978) (suggesting no need to show intent under
Title IX), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979). Note that the Supreme Court has recently granted
certiorari in a case raising the intent requirement under Title VI. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982).
338. 648 F.2d at 1109.
339. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). This case held that discriminatory pur-
pose implies that more is required for intent than "awareness of consequences." Id at 279.
340. 648 F.2d at I 110.
341. Id
342. Id
343. At that time the prevailing case was Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), applying a
"disparate effects" standard to find a violation of Title VI. The courts of appeals took the same
approach, requiring only disparate impact. See, e.g., Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem.
School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 1978); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147,
1153-54 (10th Cir. 1974). Note that one court of appeals has recently held that the holding in Lau
on disparate impact was not affected by subsequent decisions. See NAACP v. Medical Center,
Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1329 (3d Cir. 1981).
344. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Days established that the fourteenth amendment condemns only
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PersonnelAdministrator v. Feeney,345 indicate that it will be extremely
difficult for plaintiffs to establish that a facially neutral policy was
adopted with the purpose and intent of discriminating against a partic-
ular group. In Cannon's case, for example, even if she had been aware
of the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions involving the intent re-
quirement under Title VI and the fourteenth amendment and had al-
leged such, it would have been extremely difficult for her to prove that
discriminatory considerations motivated the defendants' choice of their
age policies.346
C Title VIP Rebutting a Prima Facie Case
A third noteworthy sex discrimination case was decided by the
Seventh Circuit this term. Sherkow v. Wisconsin 347 was a suit brought
under the provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,348
which bars sex discrimination in employment. 349 The main question
raised on appeal was whether the trial judge had correctly applied
Supreme Court precedent with regard to allocation of the burden of
proof. Unlike the analysis just discussed under the equal protection
clause and Titles VI and IX, the mainstay of Title VII litigation is that
plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case and thus avoid dismissal
without proving intent. The Supreme Court in the case of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green350 set forth the basic elements required to estab-
lish a prima facie case in all Title VII discrimination cases. 351 As
adapted to sex discrimination, the plaintiff need only establish that she
is a woman; that the defendant had an employment vacancy which it
intended to fill; that the plaintiff possessed the qualifications to fill the
vacancy; that she applied and was rejected; and that the defendant con-
conduct motivated by a "racially discriminatory purpose." Id at 240. The Court reiterated this
intent requirement in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977), and went on to list factors relevant in establishing discriminatory motive. Id at 266-68.
345. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
346. See Note, Personnel Administrator v. Feeney: A Policy Decision, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV.
343 (1980); Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact.- An Assessment After Fee-
ney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1376 (1979). A few lower federal courts have taken a more lenient ap-
proach to this intent requirement. In De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979), the court stated that knowing failure to revise policies, when such
policies had the direct effect of hindering or excluding the protected group, raises an inference of
intentional discrimination. 582 F.2d at 58. See also Pavey v. University of Alaska, 490 F. Supp.
1011, 1015 (D. Alaska 1980) (the combined effect of various facially neutral athletic rules could
constitute discrimination in violation of Title IX).
347. 630 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1980).
348. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
349. Id § 2000e-2.
350. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
351. Id at 802.
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tinued to seek other applicants or filled the vacancy with a male
applicant. 352
Although federal courts have had little difficulty with this aspect of
the McDonnell Douglas test, controversy has centered around the de-
fendant's rebuttal requirement. Supreme Court precedent 353 left the
courts of appeals confused as to whether the employer had to prove
that its decision was based on a legitimate consideration or whether it
simply had to come forth with some evidence. 354 The Seventh Circuit
adopted the position that the defendant merely had to "articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiff's] rejection. ' 355
It decided that the ultimate burden of persuasion always rested with the
plaintiff and that the defendant satisfied its burden by simply going
forward with evidence and explaining what it had done or by produc-
ing evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.356 It was then up
to the plaintiff to prove that the reasons advanced were a pretext or that
a motivating or substantial factor in the defendant's decision was dis-
crimination. 35 7 This analysis of the burdens of proof in Title VII cases
was subsequently adopted almost verbatim by the United States
Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine.358 The Supreme Court overturned the holding of the Fifth Cir-
cuit that the employer in a Title VII case had toprove that he hired a
more qualified individual.3 59 It noted that the ultimate burden of per-
suading a jury that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remained at all times with the plaintiff.360 Thus, the prima
facie case creates only a rebuttable presumption of discrimination
which is countered if the defendant produces any evidence that the
plaintiff was rejected for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. The
Seventh Circuit in Sherkow accurately forecast the Supreme Court's
position on this issue.
352. 630 F.2d at 502.
353. E.g., Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972).
354. 630 F.2d at 502. See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 608 F.2d 563
(5th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), where the court imposed upon the
employer the duty to prove, by objective comparative evidence, that those hired or promoted were
somehow better qualified than the plaintiff. 608 F.2d at 567.
355. 630 F.2d at 502 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802) (bracketed
material in original).
356. 630 F.2d at 502.
357. Id
358. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
359. 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979).
360. 450 U.S. at 252-53. The Court specifically noted that it was the plaintiff's task to demon-
strate that similarly situated employees were not treated equally. Id at 258.
CIVIL LIBERTIES
As applied in the Sherkow case before the Seventh Circuit, the
court recognized that the plaintiff clearly established a prima facie case.
After that the court conceded that the analysis pursued by the district
court did not "follow the paradigm of the shifting burdens as we set it
forth,"361 but the court held nonetheless that the result reached in the
case was a correct one.362 The trial judge in effect had concluded that
the reasons suggested by the defendant for the plaintiffs rejection were
a pretext. The plaintiff had been passed over for the job of education
administrator of a special educational needs program which she had
helped to develop and which she had at least in part supervised. In
addition, she scored higher in specially administered exams than the
individual to whom the job was given and had an extensive back-
ground in the field of special education which the male appointee lack-
ed. The defendant's rationale that the plaintiff was not as qualified as
the hired individual simply did not hold up in light of the facts. The
Seventh Circuit thus upheld the trial court ruling that the plaintiff had
been discriminated against based on her sex and that she was entitled
to the relief she sought.363
The same analysis of the shifting burdens of proof in Title VII
litigation was followed in Gaballah v. Johnson.364 Again the court
noted that it is not essential that a district court follow the shifting bur-
dens exactly and that McDonnell Douglas was to serve simply as a
model for evaluating the evidence concerning employment discrimina-
tion.365 In Gaballah, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court's
dismissal of the Title VII suit at the close of the plaintiffs evidence was
justified.366 The court rejected Gaballah's contention that a showing of
a prima facie case under Title VII precluded dismissal at the close of
his evidence. 367 The district court was free to proceed to the remaining
steps of the McDonnell Douglas analysis and determine from the entire
record the defendant's explanations for its actions as well as the ulti-
mate question of whether the plaintiff had shown that the defendant's
reasons were a pretext, masking actual discriminatory motivation.
Looking to the record as a whole, the Seventh Circuit found that the
district court was justified in its conclusion that no one had discrimi-
361. 630 F.2d at 503.
362. Id
363. Id
364. 629 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1980).
365. Id at 1200.
366. Id at 1201.
367. Id at 1200. The Seventh Circuit had taken the same approach in Davis v. Weidner, 596
F.2d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 1979).
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nated against Gaballah because of his race, national origin or religion.
The findings of the district court could simply not be deemed "clearly
erroneous.
'368
D. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The Seventh Circuit decided several cases interpreting the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.369 The ADEA prohibits
employers or their agents, labor organizations and employment agen-
cies from discriminating against employees because of age.
The court in at least one case this term dealt with burden of proof
issues in age discrimination cases. There is considerable confusion as
to whether Title VII standards should apply to cases arising under the
ADEA. 370 A few courts of appeals have refused to borrow and auto-
matically apply Title VII principles in age discrimination cases; 37' the
Seventh Circuit, however, has joined the majority of courts which have
adopted, with only slight variation, Title VII precedent on proof ques-
tions.372 The Seventh Circuit has followed the Fifth, First and Ninth
Circuits in applying the McDonnell Douglas standard which permits a
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination by
merely showing that he belongs to the group allegedly discriminated
against, that he was qualified for the job he sought, that he was not
hired and that the employer continued to seek applications for that
position.373
368. 629 F.2d at 1201. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) requires in part that: "Findings of fact shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
369. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Hereinafter referred to as ADEA or Act.
370. In Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), the Court noted that the substantive prohibi-
tions of the ADEA were derived "in haec verba" from Title VII. Id at 584. However, the Court
also held that the Act was to be enforced in accordance with the procedures of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Applying these principles, the
Court unanimously held that a jury trial is available in a private suit under the ADEA for lost
wages. 434 U.S. at 585. But see Lehman v. Nakshian, 101 S. Ct. 2698 (1981), in which the Court
found no right to a jury trial in ADEA suits brought against the federal government.
371. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1978); Laugesen v. Ana-
conda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
372. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 648 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1981); Sutton v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1981); Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406 (5th
Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (ist Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div., 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.
1974). Note that these decisions applied the McDonnell Douglas test as a basis for establishing a
prima facie case of age discrimination; the newer decisions also relied on recent Title VII prece-
dent in defining the employer's rebuttal burden. See also Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d
Cir. 1980) (court relied on Title VII precedent to hold that a prima facie case of discriminatory
impact may be established under ADEA by showing that the employer's facially neutral policy
has a disparate impact upon members of a protected class), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
373. 411 U.S. at 802.
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Applying that standard to the facts before it, the Seventh Circuit in
Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology374 held in a per curiam decision
that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case because he
had not established that he was qualified for the position he sought.3 75
The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal on summary judgment
and incorporated its conclusion that the plaintiffs factual allegations
and proffers of proof did not present a triable issue of fact.376
Another ADEA issue addressed by the Seventh Circuit involved
employer defenses to claims of discrimination. Once a plaintiff has es-
tablished a prima facie case, the defendant, as in a Title VII case, must
justify the existence of any disparities or otherwise prove that the al-
leged discriminatory act was privileged under one of the statutory ex-
emptions. 377 One of the key affirmative defenses available to an
employer under the ADEA, which has its counterpart in section 703(e)
of Title VII,378 is section 623(f(1)379 which protects employers' actions
based on a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular business. 380 Some courts
have applied the BFOQ exemption with greater liberality to the em-
ployer in age discrimination cases than in the Title VII context.38' The
Seventh Circuit, as well as several other federal courts, has noted that
liberality is especially justified when considerations of public safety are
presented.38 2
374. 630 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
375. 630 F.2d at 1220.
376. Id at 1218. The district court focused both on the plaintiff's admission that conflicts had
developed between himself and his superiors and his inability to contradict the depositions of
other employees stating that his work was unsatisfactory. In addition, the evidence indicated that
Kephart was not displaced by persons younger than himself.
377. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); Hodgson v. Earnest Mach. Prod.,
Inc., 479 F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1973). See also Smith & Leggette, Recent Issues in Litigation Under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 380-84 (1980).
378. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
379. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1976).
380. Hereinafter referred to as BFOQ.
381. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975). It is argued that age discrimination cases should be treated differently than
sex discrimination cases because age considerations are more job related than sex considerations.
See Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565 (1979).
382. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974) (upholding
maximum hiring age of 35 for intercity bus drivers), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Aldendifer
v. Continental Air Lines, 19 F.E.P. Cas. 1090 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (upholding forced retirement of
pilots at age 60). See also Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th Cir.
1976) (discussing the relevance of public safety considerations as a BFOQ); Beck v. Borough of
Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("The necessary quantum of evidence to be
adduced by the employer depends upon the extent and evitability of the risk of harm to which
elimination of the age requirement exposes other employees and the public generally."); Tuohy v.
Ford Motor Co., 490 F. Supp. 258, 264 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (holding that a jury should not be
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The court followed this same trend in its recent decision in EEOC
v. City of Janesville3 83 in which a police chief was retired pursuant to
the city's policy of retiring all "protective service" employees at age
fifty-five. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's construction
of BFOQ as excessively narrow. The district court held that the city
failed to show that age was a BFOQ for police chiefs.384 The Seventh
Circuit decided, however, that it was sufficient that the city establish
that its mandatory retirement program was justified as applied to a ge-
neric class of law enforcement personnel, rather than focusing on the
specific duties and requirements of a police chief.385 The court found
that the city had sustained its burden through its reliance on Wiscon-
sin's Public Employees' Retirement Act which uses an age fifty-five
limit for all protective service employees as "in the best interest of all
public safety personnel and the people they are required to serve. ' 386
The city had acted on a good faith belief that public safety required
early retirement of all protective service employees and was not re-
quired to address the specific question of whether age was a bona fide
occupational qualification for a police chief.
The Seventh Circuit adopted this restrictive approach despite the
fact that recent amendments intended to strengthen the ADEA 387 and
commentary on the new provisions suggest that employers should be
called upon to make a showing of greater justification for any age
BFOQ.388 Other circuits appear to have imposed a heavier burden on
employers, requiring them to show (1) that the BFOQ is reasonably
necessary to the essence of their business, and (2) that there is a factual
basis for believing that all or substantially all precluded persons would
be unable to perform the required tasks safely and efficiently or that it
is impossible or impractical to deal with persons over the age limit on
an individualized basis.389 Illustrative of this stricter approach is the
permitted to speculate on sufficiency of medical evidence where the claimed BFOQ involved im-
portant safety interests). See generally Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
90 HARV. L. REv. 380, 407 (1976), which notes the special importance of the safety factor in
judging ADEA claims.
383. 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
384. 480 F. Supp. 1375, 1380 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
385. 630 F.2d at 1258.
386. Id at 1258-59.
387. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
92 Stat. 189.
388. See generally Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565 (1979). Congress' intent that BFOQ be very narrowly
construed and thus applicable in few cases is also reflected in the regulations. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R.
§ 860.102 (1980).
389. See, e.g., Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); Houghton v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Usery v. Tamiami
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Eighth Circuit opinion in Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,390 re-
jecting a BFOQ defense to the forced retirement of a test pilot at age
fifty-two because the employer had not presented any concrete factual
evidence that substantially all older pilots are unable to perform their
duties safely and efficiently. 391
Although public safety factors are obviously involved in the posi-
tion of police chief, a simple assertion of public safety required for pro-
tective service employees should not be sufficient to dismiss an ADEA
claim. The city in Janesville should have been required to present con-
crete evidence, as was required in Houghton, to support age as a BFOQ
for police chiefs. A change in the position of the Seventh Circuit on
this issue is long overdue.
In addition to the BFOQ defense, the original Act also provided
an exception for both bona fide seniority systems and bona fide em-
ployee benefit plans.392 The latter exception was one of the most heav-
ily litigated portions of the Act during its first decade. 393 Although
under the 1978 amendments to the ADEA 394 an employer will no
longer be able to retire an employee under the terms of an employee
benefit plan before the employee reaches the upper limits of the age
protection, the amendments have generally been held not to be retroac-
tive.395 Thus, the Seventh Circuit was faced this term with three cases
involving interpretation of the pre-1978 bona fide employee benefit
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976). See also EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F.
Supp. 1135, 1144-45 (D. Minn. 1980) (evidence established that 65 age limit was a reasonable
requirement for captains and firefighters, but there was no factual basis for believing that substan-
tially all district fire chiefs are unable to perform their duties safely and efficiently after age 64);
Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 463 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (the record failed to show the special
relevance of the mandatory retirement age of 62 for district fire chiefs; therefore, the ordinance
was wholly lacking in any justifiable business necessity).
390. 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
391. 553 F.2d at 564.
392. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1976) (amended 1978). Prior to its amendment, see note 394 infra,
the exception provided:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organi-
zation-
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall ex-
cuse the failure to hire any individual; ....
29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1976).
393. See, e.g., cases cited note 397 infra.
394. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, amended 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) to read in part as follows:
[N]o such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involun-
tary retirement of any individual. . . because of the age of such individual; . ...
395. The weight of federal case law is that the amendment is to be given prospective applica-
tion. See cases cited in Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1980). The effect of
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plan exemption. 396
The Seventh Circuit, as well as other courts of appeals, had earlier
held that these seniority and benefit exceptions of the ADEA could be
used to insulate a pension plan where the employer had the option to
retire an employee, even though this was not mandatory for all employ-
ees.397 The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed that conclusion in Gonsalves v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co. ,398 holding that it was irrelevant that the early
retirement plan was optional since the employee did know the date at
which he might be retired.3 99 Thus, the plan was immunized under the
employee benefits exception. The Seventh Circuit refused, however, to
extend the exception to cases where the retirement benefit plan did not
explicitly provide that the employer had the right to retire an employee
before normal retirement age. In Sexton v. Beatrice Foods Co. ,400 the
plan did not expressly provide for involuntary retirement, although it
did permit the employee to elect early retirement. The Seventh Circuit
held that the employer did not observe the terms of a bona fide pension
plan within the meaning of the Act, and it rejected the district court's
reliance on the common law right of an employer to terminate its em-
ployees coupled with the provision in the plan for voluntary retirement
as a basis for upholding the employer's actionsA0
In Smart v. Porter Paint Co. ,402 the Seventh Circuit also vacated a
summary judgment entered by the district court in the case of a plan
which was amended in 1976 to lower the retirement age from sixty-five
to sixty. The Supreme Court in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann4°3
had held that it was not necessary for an employer to show a business
or economic purpose to rely on the employee benefits exception with
regard to plans adopted before the 1967 Act.404 The Seventh Circuit in
Smart held, however, that plans or amendments adopted after 1967 do
the 1978 amendments is to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). McMann is discussed in text accompanying note 403 infra.
396. Gonsalves v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 634 F.2d 1065 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
920 (1981); Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1980); Sexton v. Beatrice Foods Co.,
630 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980).
397. Minton v. Whirlpool Corp., 569 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Marshall v. Hawai-
ian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1978); Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
398. 634 F.2d 1065 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981).
399. 634 F.2d at 1067.
400. 630 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980).
401. Id at 484-85. The same conclusion was reached in EEOC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 632
F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (4th Cir. 1980), where the court required explicit language in a plan in~licating
a company prerogative to retire employees involuntarily.
402. 630 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1980).
403. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
404. Id at 203.
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require an employer to state some nondiscriminatory motivation in or-
der to avail itself of the exemption by means of summary judgment.405
The court correctly reasoned that in order to evaluate whether a post-
ADEA plan was a "subterfuge" to evade the Act,4°6 some evidence of
the plan's purpose had to be presented.40 7 The court cited other lower
court decisions which have similarly required evidence of "clear and
direct business purpose" in order to grant the defendant summary
judgment. 40 8 Since no evidence of motive or purpose was presented to
justify the employer's 1976 amendment to its plan, the district court
order granting summary judgment was vacated. 40 9
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS
Civil rights and civil liberties are obviously of little value unless
they can be enforced. While in some situations there may be other
methods of enforcement, e.g., administrative remedies, the availability
of a judicial remedy is critical. Even where rights exist, there can be
technical and practical impediments to judicial enforcement of the
rights. Numerous judicial doctrines have been developed or expanded
in recent years which make access to the federal judiciary more diffi-
cult. Some examples of these doctrines include standing, exhaustion,
abstention, comity, federalism and limitations on situations where a
remedy will be implied. An important practical deterrent, the cost of
litigation, has been removed to some extent through the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.410 Several of the decisions of the
Seventh Circuit during this term touched upon one or more of these
subjects and these will be explored in this section under three catego-
ries: right of action, limitations on relief and attorney's fees.
405. 630 F.2d at 495. Contrast this approach to bona fide pension plans under the ADEA with
the Supreme Court's recent refusal to distinguish between pre- and post-Title VII seniority sys-
tems in assessing Title VII violations. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 50 U.S.L.W. 4364
(U.S. Apr. 5, 1982). The Court reasoned that the plain language of Title VII, as well as its legisla-
tive history, indicates Title VII's protection of all bona fide seniority practices. Therefore, even a
post-Title VII seniority system which locks in past discrimination is protected unless it is accom-
panied by discriminatory purpose.
406. Note that the exemptions protect only plans which are not "a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of [the Act.]" 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
407. 630 F,2d at 495.
408. Id at 496. See, e.g., EEOC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 632 F.2d 1107, 1112-13 (4th Cir.
1980) (holding that the defendant's 1972 amendments to its plan were "a subterfuge to evade the
purposes" of the ADEA).
409. 630 F.2d at 497.
410. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (amended 1980).
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A. Right of Action
At least since Monroe v. Pape,41' civil rights litigants have relied
upon section 1983412 as the principal source of a cause of action for
suits against nonfederal governmental officials and persons acting in
concert with governmental officials.4 13 Since Monroe, section 1983 has
been both expanded and contracted by the Supreme Court. For exam-
ple, Monroe held that a municipality was not a "person" and therefore
could not be sued under section 1983. 4 14 Subsequently, in Monell v.
New York City Department of Social Services,41 5 the Court reversed this
aspect of Monroe4 6 and in Owen v. City of Independence4 17 the Court
held that municipalities not only could be sued under section 1983, but
that they could not assert the good faith of their officials as a defense to
an action for compensatory damages.41 8 Most recently, in City of New-
port v. Fact Concerts, Inc. ,419 the Court further refined Owen by hold-
ing that a municipality could not be subject to liability for punitive
damages under section 1983 based on the bad faith actions of its
officials.420
After reserving the question for many years, finally, in Maine v.
Thiboutot,42z the Court expressly held that section 1983 could be used
as a vehicle for enforcing federal statutory rights.4 22 The words "and
laws" were given their apparent meaning. The Supreme Court subse-
quently put some restrictions on Thiboutot. First, in Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman,423 the Court suggested that section
1983 might not provide a cause of action in all situations where a plain-
tiff was attempting to enforce federal statutory rights.424 This sugges-
411. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
412. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
413. Justice Powell recently stated that it "has burst its historical bounds." Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 554 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
414. 365 U.S. at 191.
415. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
416. Id at 701.
417. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
418. Id at 650.
419. 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981).
420. Id at 2762.
421. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
422. Id at 4.
423. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
424. Id at 28.
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tion became reality a few months later when, in Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,425 the Court
went out of its way426 to decide that section 1983 could not be used
where Congress intended the remedy provided under a statute to be the
sole remedy. 427 Determining the intent of Congress when it has not
been expressly indicated can, of course, be difficult.
The holding in National Sea Clammers makes the determination
of whether Congress, absent express language, intended or implied a
cause of action or remedy under a statute even more critical.428 Where
a statute provides substantive rights, there are several possibilities.
Congress may expressly provide the full range of remedies, including
attorney's fees, 4 2 9 it may provide for express remedies but limit them to
those which are equitable in nature,430 or it may be silent as to both
cause of action and remedy, in which case the courts must face the
question of whether either or both should be implied. Whenever Con-
gress does not expressly deal with cause of action or remedy, National
Sea Clammers is important because in it the Court seems to have col-
lapsed the four-part test first outlined in Cort v. Ash 4 3 1 into a determi-
nation of "whether Congress intended to create a private right of
action. ' 432 But, as Justice Stevens noted, "legislative history is unlikely
425. 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
426. Neither party raised the issue in the Supreme Court; the plaintiff did not assert a claim
under § 1983 and the lower courts did not decide the issue.
427. 101 S. Ct. at 2627.
428. This is true because if § 1983 is available in every suit against state or local officials to
enforce federal statutory rights, then the question of congressional intent can often be avoided. Of
course, if the statute does not provide any substantive rights, it is not important whether Congress
intended a cause of action. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 n.21
(1981).
429. In this case it would make little difference whether or not § 1983 is also available.
430. Here the availability of § 1983 becomes important as a basis for awarding damages and
fees under § 1988. After National Sea Clammers, a strong argument could be made that Congress,
having explicitly dealt with the remedy, intended it to be exclusive absent an indication that other
remedies would also be available. Justice Stevens argued in dissent that both statutes involved
"expressly preserve all legal remedies otherwise available." 101 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Cf. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976) (citizen suits under Federal
Water Pollution Control Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5) (1976) (civil suits by private persons under
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972).
431. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Court articulated the four factors as follows:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,"
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?. Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a rem-
edy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?. . .And finally, is the cause
of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?
Id at 78 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
432. 101 S. Ct. at 2622.
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to reveal affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to authorize a
specific procedure that the statute itself fails to mention. '433
Similarly, absent explicit language in the statute, "legislative his-
tory is unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a congressional intent"
to retain section 1983 remedies. 434 Therefore it is important that Na-
tional Sea Clammers be read to eliminate section 1983 as a vehicle to
enforce federal statutory rights only in situations where there is some
clear indication of a "congressional intent to preclude the remedy of
suits under § 1983."435 The language quoted above and the fact that
Thiboutot was not overruled supports such a reading of National Sea
Clammers.
Several cases were decided by the Seventh Circuit this term ad-
dressing the question of whether a right of action could be implied
under a federal statute. Two such cases involved the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.436 In Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co. ,437 the court, relying
primarily on Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority,438 held that a
cause of action could be implied under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973439 because the Veterans Administration, the agency
providing federal funds for an apprenticeship program, had not issued
final regulations implementing section 504.440 However, the plaintiff
employee in Simpson, who claimed a handicap based on chronic alco-
holism, did not have standing because the only federal dollars utilized
by the defendant private employer were from the Veterans Administra-
tion and the plaintiff was not a veteran.44' In other words, he was not
"otherwise eligible" to participate in the apprenticeship program. 442
433. Id at 2629 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
434. Id
435. Id at 2626.
436. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
437. 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
438. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). In Lloyd, the court found the lack of regulations important
because it left the plaintiffs without a meaningful administrative enforcement scheme. Id at 1286.
439. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), as amended by Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and De-
velopmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, tit. I, §§ 119, 122(d)(2), 92
Stat. 2982, 2987. Section 504 provides in part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . .. shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Execu-
tive agency or by the United States Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall
promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this
section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disa-
bilities Act of 1978.
440. 629 F.2d at 1230.
441. Id at 1231.
442. Absent a "nexus between [Simpson's] discharge and the federal assistance," id at 1232,
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The plaintiff also asserted a claim under section 503(a) of the Act.443
However, the court rejected this on the grounds that there was not an
implied right of action.4" The key to the court's analysis seems to be
the lack of "duty-creating language" in section 503(a) as opposed to the
language Congress used in section 504.445 The court's careful analysis
of each of the four factors identified in Cori is probably not required in
light of the most recent decisions of the Supreme Court.446
In another case, Adashunas v. Negley,447 the court summarily ap-
proved the lower court's holding that the "Rehabilitation Act does pro-
vide the handicapped with affirmative rights, does create a private right
of action and does not require exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies."44 The plaintiff in Adashunas, who was challenging the ade-
quacy of his special education program, also asserted a claim for
damages under section 1983. However, the lower court did not address
the question of whether it could be used to enforce section 504.
Finally, in Davis v. Ball Memorial Hospital Association,44 9 a case
involving the Hill-Burton Act,4 50 the court held that the plaintiffs did
not have an implied right of action under the Act to sue the Secretary
of HEW.451 This was based primarily on the fact that Congress had
amended the Act to provide expressly for private suits against the med-
ical facilities, but in doing so did not provide for suits against the Secre-
tary. As noted by the Court,
Congress apparently chose to create an enforceable interest in indi-
gent patients insofar as compliance by the facilities is con-
cerned .... It is one thing to make the patients the direct
beneficiaries of the assurances, quite another to give them an imme-
diate interest in the particulars of federal enforcement and adminis-
tration, which serve the public at large. Put more simply, the
interests implicated by an action to compel local compliance with the
assurances are different from those implicated by a suit to compel
the court was unwilling to extend the protection of § 504 to all employees, whether or not they
were "the intended beneficiaries of the federal financial assistance in question." Id at 1234.
443. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
444. 629 F.2d at 1237.
445. Id at 1240. This is consistent with Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
446. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615
(1981), and cases cited id at 2627 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
447. 626 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1980).
448. Id at 603. The primary issue in this case was whether the plaintiff could represent a class
of students with learning disabilities throughout the state of Indiana. Because of a perceived
difficulty in identifying the class members, the court affirmed the lower court's refusal to certify a
plaintiff class. Id at 603-04.
449. 640 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1980). See also notes 215-34 supra and accompanying text.
450. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
451. 640 F.2d at 44-46.
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specific action by the Secretary to compel the facilities to comply. 4 52
Even assuming the court is correct in its holding in Davis that
there is no implied right of action against the Secretary, the disturbing
aspect of the case is the court's refusal to allow the plaintiffs to proceed
against the Secretary under the Administrative Procedure Act.453 The
plaintiffs had not pleaded or argued the APA issue in the lower court
and the Seventh Circuit would not allow it at the appellate stage, treat-
ing it as an attempt to "alter the entire theory of their action with a
mere wave of the hand. ' 454 This aspect of the case seems to be clearly
wrong. First, the APA does provide for a cause of action in such a case
against a federal official. Second, changing the basis for a cause of ac-
tion certainly does not "alter the entire theory" of a case, particularly
since there is no rigid requirement to plead the source of a cause of
action. Third, the court's reference to the plaintiffs' "glib treatment of
the jurisdictional basis of a particular lawsuit"455 misses the mark be-
cause no one contends that the APA itself provides for jurisdiction. Ju-
risdiction would be provided under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.456
Even when a plaintiff can use section 1983 and not worry about
whether a right of action is implied under a statute, there is still a ques-
tion of whether the facts are sufficient to state a claim. A number of
decisions in the Seventh Circuit this term dealt with the sufficiency of
allegations in section 1983 actions.
In Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co. ,457 apro se plaintiff al-
452. Id at 45. Here again, the rigid inquiry into each of the four Cari factors is probably
outmoded after National Sea Clammers. See notes 431-35 supra and accompanying text.
453. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). Hereinafter referred to as APA. The APA provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other that [sic]
money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof
acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be
dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States
or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United States may be named as
a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the
United States: Provided, That any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the Fed-
eral officer or officers (by name or by title), and their successors in office, personally
responsible for compliance. Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial re-
view or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other
appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other
statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is
sought.
454. 640 F.2d at 47.
455. Id
456. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Even if it were considered jurisdictional, the holding is wrong
because 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1976) provides that "[diefective allegations of jurisdiction may be
amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts."
457. 644 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1980).
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leged a conspiracy between a private party and the state's attorney re-
lating to discriminatory enforcement of zoning ordinances. After a
discussion of how pro se pleadings should be liberally interpreted 458
and a recognition that private parties can be liable under section 1983
when "jointly engaged" with public officials,459 the court concluded
that the most recent amended complaint simply did not include facts
sufficient to establish a conspiracy: "Mere conjecture that there has
been a conspiracy is not enough to state a claim. A private person does
not conspire with a state official merely by invoking an exercise of the
state official's authority."460 The court was obviously looking for a
"factual basis suggesting the meeting of minds" rather than conclusory
allegations. 46'
Another conspiracy-type claim was asserted in Brucar v. Rubin.462
The plaintiffs brought a section 1983 action against the petitioning
party in a state court guardianship proceeding and her two attorneys
claiming they conspired with a state court judge to deprive the plaintiffs
of due process. The plaintiffs contended that, because the defendants
had invoked the power of the state court, the defendants acted under
color of state law within the meaning of section 1983. The court distin-
guished its earlier decision in Sparkman v. McFarlin463 in holding that
the complaint sufficiently alleged a conspiracy. Noting that even a
strict pleading requirement does not require proof, the court stated,
[A] fact finder could reasonably conclude on the basis of the Brucars'
allegations, "not only that the private party used the state court pro-
ceedings to produce a constitutional wrong, but that there was agree-
ment between the party and judge beyond ordinary request and
persuasion by the prevailing party, and that the state court judge in-
vidiously used his office to deprive the § 1983 plaintiff of a federally
protected right." 464
The sufficiency of allegations for claims under the eighth amend-
ment was considered in two prison cases. In Chavis v. Rowe,465 the
plaintiff alleged overcrowding--confinement to a five-foot by seven-
458. Id at 1207.
459. Id at 1206.
460. Id at 1208.
461. Id
462. 638 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
463. 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979). According to Brucar, the decision in McFarlin had added
"strict pleading requirements to the Adickes rule where the 'joint activity' is between private indi-
viduals and a state court official." 638 F.2d at 993 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 152 (1970)).
464. 638 F.2d at 993-94 (quoting Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1979)
(Fairchild, C.J., concurring)).
465. 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 415 (1981).
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foot cell along with four other residents-and "inadequate bedding,
light, toilet facilities, showers, access to legal materials, medical and
dental care and food. '466 These conditions existed during a six-month
period of confinement in segregation. The court concluded that the al-
legations met the test for an eighth amendment violation set forth in
Stringer v. Rowe.467 Under this test a plaintiff must "show that prison
officials intentionally inflicted excessive or grossly severe punishment
on him or that the officials knowingly maintained conditions so harsh
as to shock the general conscience. '468 It should be noted that Chavis
was decided before Rhodes v. Chapman' s9 in which the Supreme Court
for the first time "considered a disputed contention that the conditions
of confinement at a particular prison constituted cruel and unusual
punishment" 470 and held that the "discomforts" of double-ceiling do
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 471
Duncan v. Duckworth472 involved a claim for damages under the
eighth amendment based on an alleged extensive delay in providing
surgery to a prison inmate after the need for it was recognized. The
court referred to the "deliberate indifference" test from Estelle v. Gam-
ble473 and concluded that the facts alleged at least gave rise to "an
inference of such indifference. '474
Both Duncan and Chavis dealt with the liability of upper-level
prison administrators in the context of section 1983 actions. In Duncan,
the lower court, relying on Adams v. Pate,475 had dismissed the claim
for damages because the complaint failed to allege that the defendants
"personally participated in the alleged misconduct. ' 476 While reaffirm-
ing that personal knowledge or involvement must be established in or-
der for liability to arise under section 1983, the court found that the
lower court had erred in treating this "general principle of recovery
under § 1983 as a strict rule of pleading. '477 Referring then to the
lower court's dismissal of the prison hospital administrator as a defend-
ant, the court noted that as administrator he had a responsibility for
466. 643 F.2d at 1290.
467. 616 F.2d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1980).
468. 643 F.2d at 1291.
469. 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
470. Id at 2398.
471. Id at 2399.
472. 644 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1981).
473. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
474. 644 F.2d at 654.
475. 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971).
476. 644 F.2d at 655.
477. Id
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insuring that prison inmates receive adequate medical care and that
"[tihis responsibility is a sufficient basis from which to infer his per-
sonal involvement in the denial of such care at the pleading stage of the
proceeding. '478
Similarly, in Chavis, the court noted that direct responsibility for
conditions of segregation imposed on the plaintiff "must have rested on
an official at a relatively high administrative level. ' 479 In both cases
the court went on to indicate that if the high-level officials denied
knowledge and responsibility, they would be in a better position than
the plaintiff to identify those who did bear responsibility.480 This is
significant because it appears to shift the burden of identifying the re-
sponsible party to the high-level official who denies involvement or
responsibility.
The court recognized these cases as somewhat of a departure from
a strict application of Adams v. Pate but believed it was justified by the
nature of the claims:
Both cases involve claims relating to conditions or practices which, if
they in fact do exist, would very likely be known to, or acquiesced in,
by officials at a relatively high administrative level. At the same
time, the conditions or practices upon which the claims are based
may be of such a kind that the claimant will have had no personal
contact with, or knowledge of, the person directly responsible. 48t
In taking this approach, the court referred to an earlier case in which it
had indicated that a plaintiff who cannot initially identify the persons
he claims caused injury should be allowed to sue them under fictitious
names and, instead of dismissing such a complaint, the lower court
should order the disclosure of the names or permit such a plaintiff to
conduct discovery. 482 While it should be noted that several of the sec-
tion 1983 cases dealing with the sufficiency of the pleadings involved
478. Id The court did not have to confront the question of what the plaintiff had to ulti-
mately prove. Under some circumstances failure to supervise can give rise to liability. See, e.g.,
Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1981); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976); Popow v. City of
Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1979); Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich.
1979); Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
479. 643 F.2d at 1290 n.9. See also Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. granted sub nom. Finley v. Murray, 102 S. Ct. 501 (1981), a suit against the city, high-level
police officials and arresting officers, in which the plaintiff alleged an arrest pursuant to an invalid
warrant and a strip search. A dismissal was overturned on the grounds that the plaintiff was
entitled to an opportunity to prove her allegation that "similar unwarranted arrests have occurred
frequently, to the knowledge of the parties involved." 634 F.2d at 367. Such proof might show a
dereliction of duty of constitutional dimension.
480. 644 F.2d at 656; 643 F.2d at 1290 n.9.
481. 644 F.2d at 656.
482. See Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83, 87 (7th Cir. 1980).
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pro se complaints,483 the principles announced are not necessarily lim-
ited to such pleadings.
Even if the plaintiff gets beyond the cause of action hurdle, there
are other potential barriers to relief in civil rights actions. These will be
discussed in the following section.
B. Limitations on Relief
Probably the most serious limitations or restrictions on relief in
civil rights cases are those imposed by the ever-expanding notions of
comity and federalism.484 The Seventh Circuit did not deal extensively
with these concepts, however, during the 1980-81 term.4 85 Another se-
rious limitation on relief in civil rights cases which the Seventh Circuit
did address this term is public officials' immunity to damages in section
1983 cases. 486 The Supreme Court has, in Gomez v. Toledo,487 for the
483. Eg., Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1981); Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 415 (1981); Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co., 644 F.2d
1204 (7th Cir. 1980); Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Muhammad v.
Rowe, 638 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1981), in which the court overturned the granting of a motion to
dismiss and summary judgment against a prison inmate, indicating that thepro se litigant was not
only denied the appointment of counsel "but also was not informed that he could answer docu-
ments filed in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment with his own documents,
including affidavits." Id. at 696. Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO General, 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.
1980), see note 518 infra, also concerned a refusal to appoint counsel. But see Zaun v. Dobbin,
628 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1980) (dismissal of apro se complaint for failure to comply with a local rule
requiring the use of a standardized financial affidavit in seeking to proceed informapauperis was
affirmed).
484. On the Supreme Court level, these concepts were given new life in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), and have grown continually through a series of subsequent decisions. See Moore
v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
485. In one case, Schleiffer v. Meyers, 644 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1981), the court held that
Younger principles were no bar to a federal court action challenging the constitutionality of an
Indiana state court child custody decree; however, the plaintiff was unable to overcome the obsta-
cles imposed by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). In another decision, Dommer
v. Crawford, 638 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1980), the court held that a district court had gone too far in
projecting the federal court into the daily operation of the state criminal justice system. This was
based primarily on Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), a case with definite comity and federal-
ism overtones. The original opinion in Dommer was withdrawn after a petition for rehearing was
filed and was superseded by an opinion issued on July 7, 1981. See 653 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam). The second opinion upheld the relief which required the defendants to bring per-
sons arrested and charged with a state criminal offense before a magistrate for an initial court
appearance within 24 hours of their arrest. However, the relief was reversed insofar as it applied
to a prosecuting attorney who took office after the facts complained of and who was not proved to
be responsible for the illegal conduct. Rizzo-type concerns were also expressed in Murray v. City
of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 367 n.4 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. Finley v. Murray, 102 S.
Ct. 501 (1981).
486.' See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
487. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
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first time made it clear that a qualified immunity from damages must
be asserted by the defendant as an affirmative defense.488 The Court,
however, dealt only with the burden of pleading, not the burden of
proof. While the burden of proof normally, follows the burden of
pleading, it is not automatic. Thus, the Seventh Circuit holding in
Chavis v. Rowe 489 that the defendants must "prove that they acted in
good faith before they are granted qualified immunity" 490 is of some
significance.
Three Seventh Circuit cases dealt with the tough question of
whether a qualified immunity was available. 491 In Hayes v. Thomp-
son ,492 the court found that while the due process rights of the plaintiff
had been violated by the prison disciplinary committee's denial of the
plaintiff's request for witnesses and an inadequate statement of reasons
given for disciplinary action, it could not overturn the lower court find-
ing of good faith as clearly erroneous.493 The key factor in the court's
decision seems to have been that the prison officials made some effort
to comply with the requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell.494 Judge
Swygert dissented from this part of the decision, noting that the lower
court had adopted the defendant's proposed findings "wholesale" and
therefore sh6uld have been subjected to a more critical review even
though the "clearly erroneous" standard would still apply.495 Accord-
ing to Judge Swygert, the majority's decision "encourages official igno-
rance of the law" and it should be no defense to suggest, as the
defendants did at trial, "that no one had explained Wolff to them." 496
In Wood v. Strickland,497 the Supreme Court, in the school disci-
pline context, set forth a three-prong test for determining when public
officials can be deprived of their immunity from liability for damages.
First, the constitutional right allegedly violated must have been clearly
488. Id at 640.
489. 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 415 (1981).
490. 643 F.2d at 1288 (emphasis added). See also Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365,
367 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub non Finley v. Murray, 102 S. Ct. 501 (1981) (defendant
officers must "plead and prove" their entitlement to a qualified immunity).
491. Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 U.S. 415 (1981); Hayes v.
Thompson, 637 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1980); Mary and Crystal v. Ramsden, 635 F.2d 590 (7th Cir.
1980).
492. 637 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1980).
493. Id at 491.
494. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
495. 637 F.2d at 495 n.4 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority,
while it agreed that the review would be more critical in this situation, still upheld the lower court.
Id at 490.
496. Id at 495 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
497. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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established at the time of the challenged conduct. Second, the defend-
ants must have known of that right. Finally, the defendants knew or
should have known that their conduct would violate that right.498 This
test was applied by the Court to prison officials in Procunier v. Nava-
relte.499 Also in the prison discipline context, the Seventh Circuit in
Chavis v. Rowe5°° examined each of the three prongs and concluded
that the defendants had not established their entitlement to a qualified
immunity with respect to one of the plaintiff's due process claims-
failure to provide a written statement of the reasons for the disciplinary
action and the evidence relied on.50 Such a statement was required by
both the Supreme Court502 and earlier decisions of the Seventh Cir-
cuit, 50 3 so the right was clearly established.5°4 It was easy to conclude
that the defendants knew or should have known of this right because it
was incorporated into department regulations promulgated after the
Supreme Court decision. Finally, the case was distinguished from
Hayes because it was clear that the meager statement provided by the
defendants did not satisfy the constitutional norm and they should
have known this. As to another due process claim, the defendants' fail-
ure to inform the plaintiff of certain exculpatory evidence, the court
reluctantly held that the defendants, on remand, must be given an op-
portunity to prove that they acted in good faith. 50 5
Even assuming lawyers and judges can agree on a test for deter-
mining whether a qualified immunity exists, it is not easy to communi-
cate the standard to a jury. In Mary and Crystal v. Ramsden,50 6 the
court approved the following jury instruction:
In considering whether a particular defendant acted in good faith
belief that his or her acts were lawful, you must consider two factors.
First, you should consider whether the defendant has asserted his or
her belief that the acts were lawful. And second, you must consider
whether the defendant was reasonable in this belief. First, whether
the defendant did believe that the acts were lawful and second,
498. Id at 322.
499. 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978).
500. 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 415 (1981).
501. 643 F.2d at 1288-89.
502. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
503. Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); Aikens v.
Lash, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 425 U.S. 947, reinstated
as modified, 547 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1976).
504. But cf. Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488, 498-500 (7th Cir. 1981), in which the court found
that the law relating to the use of tear gas in prisons and the conditions in confinement for pretrial
detainees was not so clearly established in 1975 as to preclude a reasonable belief that the plain-
tiffs' constitutional rights were not being violated.
505. 643 F.2d at 1288.
506. 635 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1980).
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whether that belief on the part of the defendant was reasonable.50 7
The court also held that a member of the correctional staff, who served
as part of a committee which imposed discipline, was performing a
function "more similar to that of the school board members in Wood v.
Strickland. . .than to that of a judge. ' 50 8 Therefore, she was entitled
to only a qualified immunity. This demonstrates the functional ap-
proach to immunity determinations, ie., looking beyond the official's
title to an examination of what is actually being done by the official
and inquiring into whether the policy reasons supporting qualified im-
munity apply to the situation. 5°9
Assuming a section 1983 plaintiff gets beyond an immunity de-
fense, the test for damages becomes critical. The Seventh Circuit de-
cided a case which is quite helpful in understanding the scope of
damages, both compensatory and punitive, in an action under section
1983. In Busche v. Burkee,5 10 the plaintiff had been unlawfully termi-
nated from his position as a police officer and the lower court awarded
him $10,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000 in punitive damages
against the mayor of Kenosha. The court first held that federal, rather
than state, common law governs the determination of damages under
section 1983 and that the law "must be fashioned to promote the pur-
poses underlying the enactment of § 1983.' 51 It also noted that the
amount of damages necessary to compensate a plaintiff is a factual
matter to be upset on appeal only if clearly erroneous. 512 While the
award here was based solely on intangible losses, ie., damage to repu-
tation and emotional distress, the court could not "say that the evidence
of Busche's emotional distress and damaged reputation was insufficient
to sustain the district court's finding that an award of $10,000 was nec-
essary to properly compensate him for the deprivation of his due pro-
cess rights."5 13 Recognizing that the injuries and the determination of
amount of damage are "subjective," the court nevertheless found that
the amount was supported by sufficient competent evidence.514 This is
true even though the only supporting evidence was the testimony of the
plaintiff rather than that of medical or psychiatric experts.
507. Id at 598.
508. Id at 600 (citation omitted).
509. See also Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
510. 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. ), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981).
511. 649 F.2d at 518.
512. Id
513. Id at 519.
514. Id at 519-20.
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Regarding punitive damages, the court upheld the award of $2,000
based on a "willful and intentional violation of plaintiffs constitutional
rights." 515 The defendant's intentional and considered disregard of the
plaintiff's rights demonstrated the malicious intent. It is proper to con-
sider the deterrent function of an award of punitive damages in relation
to other, future executive officials, even though it is unlikely that the
named defendant would again be in a position to perpetuate such un-
lawful conduct.
C Attorney's Fees
An important factor in deciding whether to seek judicial enforce-
ment of civil rights is the cost of litigation. The most significant aspect
of this is, of course, the cost of counsel. In order to alleviate this prob-
lem, Congress has included in several civil rights acts a provision for
awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party.516 Congress also ad-
ded to section 1988 the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 to provide for attorney's fees to the prevailing party in several
types of civil rights actions,517 including cases brought under section
1983.518
A common question under section 1988 is whether the plaintiff is
the "prevailing party." More specifically, there is often a question as to
whether a plaintiff who was successful on less than all of the issues or
515. Id at 520.
516. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976) (Voting Rights Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976) (Ti-
tle II of Civil Rights Act of 1967); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976) (Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of
1964); 20 U.S.C. § 3205 (Supp. III 1979) (Emergency School Aid Act).
517. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (amended 1980). Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or pro-
ceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a viola-
tion of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
518. While § 1988 does not provide for the appointment of counsel, some civil rights statutes
do. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). In Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO General, 626 F.2d
576 (7th Cir. 1980), the Seventh Circuit for the first time enunciated some standards for the ap-
pointment of counsel under Title VII. It adopted the approach of the Fifth Circuit which articu-
lates three factors to be weighed by the district court: "[T]he merits of the plaintiffs claim, the
plaintiffs diligence in attempting to obtain a lawyer, and the plaintiffs financial ability to retain
counsel." Id at 577. The court also emphasized that the appointment of counsel is a matter for
the district court's discretion, considering these guidelines, and further indicated that the district
court may employ whatever procedure it finds most useful in making an informed decision. Id at
578. Another case, Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981), identified several factors "high-
ly relevant" to a request for appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1976 & Supp. III
1979). The initial inquiry concerns the merits of the indigent's claim. If it is "colorable," then the
court should consider the nature of the factual issues raised, the likelihood of conflicting evidence,
the capability of the indigent litigant to present the case and the complexity of the legal issues
raised. 650 F.2d at 887-89.
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claims raised should be considered the prevailing party. An earlier
case made it clear that section 1988 "does not require success on every
issue, but [requires] a determination that the plaintiff below 'prevailed
in a practical sense.' ",519 Several cases this term raised this issue. In
Murphy v. Kolovitz,520 the plaintiff, a twelve-year-old boy, brought an
action claiming an unlawful or false arrest and the unjustifiable use of
force in the arrest. He did not sufficiently prove false arrest; however,
he did prove an unjustifiable physical abuse and recovered $2,000 in
compensatory damages. Because the essential issue was the "unwar-
ranted conduct of a police officer toward a twelve year old boy[,] ' '521
the outcome in the case was not a "draw." 522 By establishing improper
police conduct, the plaintiff prevailed in a practical sense.
Two other cases seem to be in conflict on this point. In Sherkow v.
Wisconsin,523 the plaintiff prevailed in part in an action under Title VII
claiming sex discrimination. The defendant contended that since the
plaintiff had not prevailed as to her entire claim, the recovery of attor-
ney's fees should be reduced accordingly. This argument was rejected
on the basis of the rationale of the Sixth Circuit in Northcross v. Board
of Education524 under which the test for section 1988 recovery seems to
be whether the party prevailed "on the case as a whole. ' 525 If so, then
the district court should allow compensation for hours expended on
unsuccessful research unless the positions asserted were frivolous. Any
other rule would "discourage innovative and vigorous lawyering in a
changing area of the law. ' 526 The mandate to use the "broadest and
most flexible remedies available" to enforce civil rights laws is best
served by "encouraging attorneys to take the most advantageous posi-
tion on their clients' behalf that is possible in good faith. '527
Subsequently, in Busche v. Burkee,528 another panel completely
ignored Sherkow in rejecting "the rule announced in Northcross [even
though it] may have considerable merit."52 9 This panel found North-
519. Murphy v. Kolovitz, 635 F.2d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Dawson v. Pastrick, 600
F.2d 70, 78 (7th Cir. 1979)).
520. 635 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1981).
521. Id at 663.
522. See Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co., 596 F.2d 183, 187 (7th Cir. 1979) (each party
prevailed on one issue; no fees awarded).
523. 630 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1980). See also notes 347-63 supra and accompanying text.
524. 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
525. 611 F.2d at 636.
526. Id
527. Id
528. 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981).
529. 649 F.2d at 522.
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cross at odds with the formulation adopted in Muscare v. Quinn530
which held that "attorney's fees should be awarded under § 1988 only
for preparation and presentation of the claims on which a plaintiff is
determined to have prevailed." 53' There was no question that Busche
was the prevailing party; however, it was not clear from the record
whether fees had been awarded only for services reasonably related to
the recovery of damages. Busche had not succeeded on all issues nor
against all defendants.
The tests in Northcross and Muscare may not be all that far apart.
In Muscare, the plaintiff asserted a first amendment challenge to the
constitutionality of the Chicago Fire Department's grooming regula-
tion restricting facial hair on firefighters. He also challenged, on due
process grounds, the procedures used in disciplining him for violating
the regulation. The constitutionality of the regulation was upheld, but
the Seventh Circuit found that the procedures violated due process. 532
The claims were clearly distinguishable and the court, later addressing
the attorney's fee issue, found that the procedural issue, "though signif-
icant, was not the main part of this case."' 533 Even if Muscare is limited
to situations where the successful and unsuccessful claims are clearly
distinguishable and separate, the test in Northcross better serves the
purposes of section 1988.534
A limited reading of Muscare may find support in Entertainment
Concepts, Inc. III v. Macieewski535 where the court referred to Mus-
care in holding the plaintiff was the prevailing party because he "essen-
tially succeeded in obtaining the relief he sought in his claims on the
merits, even though he did not obtain damages or a declaratory judg-
ment. ' 536 The plaintiff was successful in the constitutional challenges
to a zoning ordinance and obtained an injunction prohibiting its en-
530. 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980).
531. 649 F.2d at 522 (citing Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d at 580-81).
532. 614 F.2d at 580.
533. Id.
534. There is not a uniform approach to this issue among the circuits. For example, the Fifth
Circuit excludes time spent on unsuccessful claims which clearly lack merit; however, lack of
success is not a basis for automatic exclusion because the relationship of the claims and contribu-
tion to the success must be considered. See Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir.
1981). The Eighth Circuit relied on the legislative history of§ 1988 in holding a plaintiff entitled
to fees for all time "reasonably expended on a matter." Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 (8th
Cir. 1978). See also Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978);
Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1978).
535. 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981). See also notes 13-26.supra
and accompanying text.
536. 631 F.2d at 507.
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forcement. Thus it was only in parts of the requested relief that the
plaintiff was unsuccessful. 537 The case was remanded for a determina-
tion of an appropriate award of fees, presumably for all the time ex-
pended by the plaintiff's counsel.5 38
Two other cases addressing the meaning of "prevailing party" are
worth mentioning. In Skoda v. Fontani,539 the Seventh Circuit held
that the lower court was wrong in determining that the plaintiffs had
not prevailed because the jury returned a verdict of only one dollar.540
Even though it might be considered a "small victory," the plaintiffs did
win. The plaintiffs in Bond v. Stanton54 ' were found entitled to fees for
postjudgment efforts in securing implementation of the judgment, for
time spent defending the judgment on the merits on appeal and for
time spent in litigating, both in the district court and on the appellate
level, their entitlement to fees.542 Absent an award for time spent liti-
gating the fee issue, the original fee award would be diluted and the
purpose of the Act would be frustrated.543
Another common concern in awarding attorney's fees relates to
the identification of factors to be considered in arriving at the amount
of the award. Macieewski reaffirmed the adoption of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's standards 544 established in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc. 545 These are practically identical to Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the
537. In this case the court also rejected the defendants' argument that lack of bad faith was a
special circumstance justifying denial of fees and their argument that inability to pay was a special
circumstance. Id
538. Id at 508.
539. 646 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1981).
540. Id at 1194.
541. 630 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1980).
542. Id. at 1233.
543. Id at 1235.
544. 631 F.2d at 508.
545. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The factors set out in Johnson and adopted by the Seventh
Circuit both in Maciejewski and in Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd in
part, 446 U.S. 754 (1980), are as follows:
(1) The time and labor required.
(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(3) The skill requisite to perform the legal services properly.
(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of a case.
(5) The customary fee.
(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances.
(8) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(9) The experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys.
(10) The "undesirability" of the case.
(11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(12) Awards in similar cases.
488 F.2d at 717-19.
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American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility. 546
Later, in Coop v. City of South Bend,547 the court referred to these stan-
dards as guidelines and indicated that it is not required that each of
them be "considered and passed on specifically" since the award is to
be "based on the totality of the case in light of the purpose of the
act."' 548 It was also suggested that in certain cases other factors might
be considered; 549 however, these factors were not identified.
It is apparent in Coop that the court was concerned with the
amount of the fee award in relation to the amount of recovery. 50 In a
case decided a few weeks earlier, Mary and Crystal v. Ramsden,551 the
court explicitly held that it was appropriate for the trial court to reduce
the hourly rates by forty percent "to bring the total compensation al-
lowed into more reasonable relationship with the monetary recovery in
the case." 552 This is somewhat disturbing. Presumably such a reduc-
tion, if ever appropriate, would be limited to cases seeking damages
only. But Mary and Crystal was not such a case; it was a class action
for injunctive relief relating to discipline at a juvenile correctional insti-
tution. If the courts are free to adjust the fee award to reflect the mone-
tary relief, then a case could have broad impact based on equitable
relief but result in a small fee because of a small damage award. This
would not only discourage requests for damages but would generally
discourage civil rights litigation.5 53
Once it is determined that a plaintiff has prevailed, then "fees
should ordinarily be granted 'as a matter of course' absent circum-
stances which would render them unjust. ' 554 The special circum-
546. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-106.
547. 635 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1980).
548. Id at 655.
549. Id
550. Id In Coop, the trial court awarded fees of $6,000 against the three defendants who had
been found liable for damages in the amount of $510. The other five defendants were either
dismissed or successful on a motion for directed verdict. The award in fees appeared to the Sev-
enth Circuit to be somewhat disproportionate to the amount of the recovery; it recognized, how-
ever, that "it would not be inconsistent with the record for the court to have concluded that the
judgment would have an effect beyond the confines of the case." Id at 654.
551. 635 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1980).
552. Id at 601. The court did, however, reject the lower court's 40% reduction based on the
fact that the plaintiffs were represented by an entity financed by government and private contribu-
tions. Id at 601-02.
553. Compare Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 608 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1979) (rejects
premise that fees should be limited to amount of pecuniary recovery), with Furtado v. Bishop, 604
F.2d 80, 98 (1st Cir. 1979) (lower court erred in cutting fee request in half to make award consis-
tent with contingent fee arrangement based on a percentage of the recovery), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1035 (1980).
554. Murphy v. Kolovitz, 635 F.2d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Davis v. Murphy, 587
F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 1978)). Note that the test is clearly different when a defendant prevails.
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stances justifying the denial of fees to a prevailing plaintiff must be
identified by the trial court.5 55 Even though the Act makes the award
of fees discretionary, an appellate court "cannot perform its function of
delimiting the scope of discretion where there is-no reason given for the
decision below.155 6 In Murphy v. Kolovitz, 557 the Seventh Circuit
adopted the rule announced by the First Circuit in Sargeant v.
Sharp-.558 Although adopting the Sargeant rule, the court indicated it
did not intend a rigid application of the rule to require that the special
circumstances "always be neatly packaged and labeled on the record,"
as long as the circumstances are "otherwise clearly and unarguably rec-
ognizable in the record as developed by the trial judge. '55 9
Finally, two cases last term addressed the important question of
the timing of an application for an attorney's fee award. In Bond v.
Stanton,560 the court expressly rejected the argument that a request for
fees, if the matter is not dealt with in the judgment, must be filed within
the ten-day period allowed for motions to alter or amend judgment
under rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 56' The plain-
tiffs filed a motion for additional fees in January 1979 which, in part,
sought fees for time spent implementing a summary judgment entered
by the district court in 1974. The Seventh Circuit accepted the position
of the Fifth Circuit on this issue: "[A] motion for attorney's fees is
unlike a motion to alter or amend a judgment. It does not imply a
change in the judgment, but merely seeks what is due because of the
judgment. It is, therefore, not governed by the provisions of Rule
See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). The standard there is
whether "a court finds that [the plaintiff's] claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or
that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Id A fee award to two prevail-
ing defendants was upheld in Mary and Crystal v. Ramsden, 635 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1980), on the
grounds that it was unreasonable for the plaintiffs to join the two defendants with respect to the
claim for money damages and "as the case progressed it was unreasonable for the plaintiffs to
refrain from voluntarily dismissing the action against them as to monetary relief." Id at 603.
555. Murphy v. Kolovitz, 635 F.2d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 1981).
556. Id
557. 635 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1981).
558. 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978). The Sargeam court held:
[Tihe summary disposition of the threshold question of entitlement in an informal unre-
corded settlement conference followed by issuance of an order denying counsel fees
without an adequate statement of the reasons for the order does not meet minimum
standards of procedural fairness and regularlity. . . .Nor does an order issued without
a deliberate articulation of its rationale, including some appraisal of the factors underly-
ing the court's decision, allow for a disciplined and informed review of the court's
discretion.
Id at 647 (citations omitted).
559. 635 F.2d at 664.
560. 630 F.2d 1231 (7th Ci. 1980).
561. Id at 1234. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
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59(e)." 562
There was a wide range of views among the circuits on this is-
sue. 563 The conflicts have now been resolved by the recent Supreme
Court decision in White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment
Security.564 In reversing the First Circuit's holding that requests for
fees must be filed within the ten days allowed by rule 59(e), the Court
stated that "a request for attorney's fees under § 1988 raises legal issues
collateral to the main cause of action-issues to which Rule 59(e) was
never intended to apply. ' 565 The Court went on to point out that the
fee determination will "require an inquiry separate from the decision
on the merits-an inquiry that cannot even commence until one party
has 'prevailed.' "566
In a somewhat advisory opinion in Terket v. Lund,567 the court
recognized the problem resulting from the consideration of a request
for fees after final judgment. It indicated that the district courts should
retain jurisdiction, even after a notice of appeal on the merits, to con-
sider the fee issue.5 68 However, the district courts were encouraged to
consider the fee issue as expeditiously as possible to enhance the
chances of consolidating the fee appeal with the appeal on the mer-
its.56 9 This, too, is consistent with White.570
With the exception of the court's approval of a substantial reduc-
tion of the fee award to bring it in line with the damage award and the
confusion over the test to be applied when a plaintiff prevails in part,
the law in this circuit on attorney's fees in civil rights litigation is quite
encouraging. These recent developments should have the effect of pro-
moting Congress' intent in passing the 1976 act--to encourage attor-
neys to bring civil rights litigation.
562. Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980).
563. See Obin v. District No. 9, Int'l Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574, 578-
83 (8th Cir. 1981); Bacon v. Toia, 648 F.2d 801, 809-10 (2d Cir.),prob.juris. noted, 102 S. Ct. 969
(1981); Johnson v. Snyder, 639 F.2d 316, 317 (6th Cir. 1981); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 786-
88 (10th Cir. 1981), opinion clarfed onpetitionfor rehearing, 649 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1981); Jones
v. Dealers Tractor & Equip. Co., 634 F.2d 180, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1981); Gary v. Spires, 634 F.2d
772, 773 (4th Cir. 1980); Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 497 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed,
451 U.S. 935 (1981); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1012 (1981); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980).
564. 102 S. Ct. 1162 (1982).
565. Id at 1166.
566. Id
567. 623 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1980).
568. Id at 33-34.
569. Id at 34.
570. 102 S. Ct. at 1168 ("IT]he district courts generally can avoid piecemeal appeals by
promptly hearing and deciding claims to attorney's fees.").
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VII. CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, this term did not significantly advance or
facilitate civil rights litigation in the Seventh Circuit. There were, how-
ever, a few novel issues decided-whether an applicant expressing Nazi
beliefs and sympathies can be excluded from the ROTC 57' and whether
CETA workers can be allocated to a Catholic archdiocese to perform
functions in elementary and secondary parochial schools 572-and sev-
eral cases dealing with fees, 573 which are certainly of interest to attor-
neys. In general, the court did not venture too far from fairly well-
established principles in deciding the cases reviewed here.
571. See notes 83-94 supra and accompanying text.
572. See notes 140-79 supra and accompanying text.
573. See notes 516-70 supra and accompanying text.

